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Introduction
Jon Neill
Western Michigan University
In the early 1970s, the War on Poverty appeared to be near a suc 
cessful conclusion. In 1960, 18.1 percent of American families were 
living in poverty. But by 1973, the poverty rate of American families 
had fallen to 8.8 percent. Over this thirteen-year period there was an 
equally impressive reduction in the percentage of families living near 
poverty. The percentage of families below 125 percent of the poverty 
level dropped from 25 to 12.8 percent. During the 1960s, inequality 
also declined significantly, at least by some measures. In 1960, the top 
quintile of families earned 41.3 percent of aggregate income while the 
bottom quintile earned 4.8 percent, for a ratio of income shares of 8.6. 
By 1970, this ratio had fallen to 7.57.
Unfortunately, the success of the U.S. economy in reducing poverty 
and inequality did not continue into the next decade. After 1973 the 
poverty rate rose fitfully, to 10.3 percent in 1980, 10.7 percent in 1990, 
and 11.7 percent in 1992. Likewise, the near-poverty rate climbed 3 
percentage points, to 15.8 percent. Changes in the shares of aggregate 
income received by families at the top and bottom of the income distri 
bution were no less disturbing. Between 1970 and 1980, the top to bot 
tom quintile share ratio rose slightly, to 7.98. However, over the next 
ten years it increased dramatically, to 10.14. In fact, each of the first 
four quintiles earned a smaller fraction of aggregate income in 1992 
than they did in 1980. In total, there was a transfer of 3.1 percent of 
aggregate income from these four quintiles to the top quintile, with 
about 74 percent of this transfer going to families in the top 5 percent 
of the income distribution. 1
In looking for an explanation for this trend, it is perhaps tempting to 
turn to changing political and social conditions and institutions. Yet 
while political and social change may have played an important role in 
reshaping the distribution of income in the United States, income dis 
tribution is ultimately an economic phenomenon. After all, income is 
determined by market forces and the policies that governments adopt
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to restrain and redirect them. Without a thorough study of the eco 
nomic events of the past twenty years, it is highly unlikely that this 
unsettling rise in poverty and inequality can be fully understood.
To answer the questions that these unhappy events confront us with, 
it is necessary to consult economists from a fairly wide range of fields. 
To begin with, the distributional changes of the past decade and a half 
must be carefully quantified and placed in the proper context. For 
example, it is important to know if these changes were confined to par 
ticular regions or subgroups in the United States, and if they were 
reflective of changes taking place in other industrialized economies. 
International trade has become a much larger part of economic life, and 
the U.S. economy is no longer a monolith, largely unmoved by eco 
nomic developments abroad.
The role of the political process in determining the distribution of 
income would also seem to be of paramount importance. Although it 
may be coincidental, the rhetoric and policies of the Reagan-Bush 
administration constituted a clear repudiation of the social philosophy 
and programs of the Kennedy-Johnson administration. In any case, one 
cannot help wondering how it is that, in a democratic society, the top 
20 percent of the population would be able to increase its share of 
aggregate income. This is an interesting public choice question, but the 
failure of middle- and lower-income families to increase their share of 
aggregate income may be at least partly due to the intergenerational 
transmission of economic status.
However important these questions may be, many find the most 
interesting and provocative aspect of the disfavor which the economy 
has shown poor and middle income families over the past two decades 
to be the bounty that it simultaneously created for others. Although the 
economy did not grow as rapidly during the 1980s as it did during the 
1960s, the decade was marked by impressive growth in real domestic 
product. Between 1982 and 1990, real GDP increased about 30 per 
cent. But unlike other expansions, this one was not accompanied by 
less poverty and inequality; the benefits from the expanding economy 
apparently did not trickle down, as so many argued would happen.
Of course the relationship between growth and distribution is com 
plicated and obscure. Presumably wages rise rapidly in an expanding 
economy, more rapidly than other components of income. And since 
poor and low-income families are typically families for whom wages
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are the most important component of income, many are pulled out of 
poverty and into the middle class by the expansion. Thus, the obvious 
question is: what role did labor markets play in reshaping the distribu 
tion of income? A quick look at the wage and salary component of 
national income reveals that, in real terms, there was only modest 
growth between 1980 and 1990, about 26 percent, compared to over 49 
percent between 1960 and 1970. In fact, this component grew only 
slightly more than it did between 1970 and 1980 (22.5 percent), a 
period that is not usually viewed as a time when the economy was 
good to wage earners. Moreover, the share of national income gener 
ated by wages and salaries continued to decline. This share rose 
slightly more than 2 percentage points between 1960 and 1970, but fell 
almost 5 percentage points between 1970 and 1990.
The lecture series that produced the essays in this volume was orga 
nized for the purpose of bringing together six well-known economists 
to learn their views on these and related issues. The lectures were 
delivered at Western Michigan University during the 1994-95 aca 
demic year, at the height of the debate over the need for welfare 
reform. The points raised by the authors reflect the concerns and hopes 
of many economists for that endeavor. They also offer a perspective 
from which to observe and evaluate the impact of the recently passed 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act on 
the behavior and economic fortunes of low income families.
The essay that opens this collection is by Professor Robert Have- 
man. What Professor Haveman offers us is a critique of the two pro 
posals that shaped the current debate over welfare reform, the proposal 
from the Clinton Administration and that found in the Contract With 
America. It is not surprising that both plans emphasize moving welfare 
recipients off the welfare rolls and into the labor market, since this has 
been a long-playing theme in U.S. political economy. Even when the 
War on Poverty was at its height and a guaranteed income was being 
given serious consideration, many—including liberals such as Robert 
Kennedy—continued to maintain that finding jobs for the poor, or as 
Lyndon Johnson put it, turning "tax-eaters" into tax-payers, should be 
the purpose of the nation's welfare system.2 However, Professor Have 
man argues that the labor market today is markedly different from the 
labor market of the 1960s. Consequently, the prospects for moving sig 
nificant numbers of people off the welfare rolls and into jobs paying
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wages that would lift them out of poverty may be more remote and, 
very likely, not particularly cost-efficient.
The next contribution to this volume is Professor Rebecca Blank's 
analysis of the relationship between the incidence of poverty and eco 
nomic growth. It is often argued that the most effective policies for 
reducing poverty and inequality are pro-growth policies. The coinci 
dence of rapid growth and a declining poverty rate throughout the 
1960s would seem to support this relationship. Yet the 1980s presents a 
compelling counter-example. Professor Blank evaluates a number of 
explanatory hypotheses that have been offered, and like Haveman, she 
sees the labor market as problematic. In her opinion, skilled-biased 
technical progress and the internationalization of the U.S. economy 
may be the two major reasons for the failure of growth to reduce the 
poverty rate.
The third and fourth essays, those by Professors John Formby and 
Timothy Smeeding, address the question of how widespread the rise in 
poverty and inequality actually was. In his paper, Professor Formby 
examines the extent of inequality in various U.S. geographical regions 
over the past three decades using different measures of inequality and 
definitions of income. His analysis clearly shows that comparisons of 
regional income distributions are sensitive to the way in which income 
is defined, and that while regional income distributions are becoming 
more similar, this is due to both a decrease in inequality in the South 
and increased inequality in the Northeast and West. Professor Formby 
ends his paper with an evaluation of the effect of recent policy initia 
tives on standard measures of inequality.
In contrast, Smeeding's essay focuses on cross-country comparisons 
of income distributions. From the data that he presents, two facts 
emerge. First, the United States has more inequality than any other 
OECD country. Second, though the increase in inequality experienced 
by the United States during the 1980s was not an isolated event, only a 
few OECD countries had as large an increase in inequality. Further 
more, in eleven of the twenty-four countries in Smeeding's survey, 
there was no discernible increase in disposable income inequality. This 
suggests that the safety net in many countries was sufficiently strong to 
resist the impact of the structural changes that took place, or that pro 
active policies were effective in preventing inequality from increasing.
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The papers by Jere Behrman and Gordon Tullock both speak to the 
intergenerational dimension of income transfers, though from different 
perspectives for different ends. Professor Behrman is concerned with 
the effect of a family's economic status on that of its children. At issue 
are the principles that guide the intra-household allocation of resources 
and the claim that the children of high income parents tend to have 
high incomes themselves. Behrman contrasts the assumptions and 
implications of two competing models of intra-household resource 
allocation in the light of recent empirical work to provide insight into 
how strong the connection between parent and child incomes may be. 
And although his analysis leads to the conclusion that the economic 
status of a child's parents plays a large role in determining the child's 
income, Behrman is quick to emphasize that the importance of educa 
tion should not be discounted.
The paper that closes this volume raises a number of elusive and dis 
turbing questions. Professor Tullock begins his discussion by asking: 
what if redistribution has a depressing effect on growth? While it may 
be that the relationship between economic growth and redistributive 
policies is unclear, there are theoretical reasons to suspect a negative 
relationship. In Tullock's view, such a relationship presents ethical 
questions and may explain the apathy of lower-income households 
toward redistribution. In reminding us that when growth is affected by 
redistribution, the economic status of future generations must be con 
sidered before writing any normative prescription, Professor Tullock's 
observations are both provocative and insightful.
These six essays offer a wide perspective on poverty and inequality 
from a group of scholars who have made significant contributions to 
this important field of research. They certainly are worthwhile reading 
for anyone concerned about rising poverty and inequality. It is wishful 
to think that recent developments are aberrant, that soon poverty and 
inequality will begin to decline, particularly if government stays the 
pro-growth course. Thus, if poverty and inequality create the social 
pathologies that have become commonplace in the United States, as so 
many argue, a "kinder, gentler" America is not likely to become a real 
ity until this pernicious trend is reversed.
6 Introduction
NOTES
1 The statistics cited here come from vanous issues of the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States.
2. Moymhan (1973, pp. 61-63, 130-131)
Reference
Moynihan, Daniel P. 1973. The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon 
Administration and the Family Assistance Plan. New York: Vintage Books.

Welfare Report—1996 Style
Will We Sacrifice the "Safety Net"?
Robert Haveman
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Why is it that we have welfare reform on our plate again? In my 
opinion, the reasons are neither cost or program growth, nor any notion 
that we have a "welfare crisis," irrespective of what either President 
Clinton or House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich say. 
Moreover, there are no new or startling revelations of waste and ineffi 
ciency.
In part, we got into this debate again because President Clinton 
started it. The fact is that every President since 1970 has had a welfare 
reform plan save George Bush. But this pushes the issue back a step. 
Why has every President felt a need to place this issue on the nation's 
agenda? In part, all observers agree that current income support policy 
contains bad incentives and gives the wrong messages to recipients; 
moreover, it has failed to reduce poverty.
For two decades now, we have seen antipoverty expenditures rising, 
but poverty has not been reduced. Under these conditions, it is difficult 
to argue that the strategy is working, especially when people are impa 
tient. Moreover, the system that we have in place now has visible 
adverse incentives and a bewildering, multi-program patchwork that 
leads to well-known examples of horizontal inequity—among states, 
between one- and two-parent families, and between the working and 
nonworking poor. It discourages work, encourages family breakup, and 
prohibits the accumulation of assets beyond a bare minimum.
However, beyond all of these reasons for why we are again 
enmeshed in this debate is a simple overriding fact. There now exists a 
fundamental gap between the objectives of welfare and related pro 
grams and the society's social and economic goals.
At their core, existing welfare programs seek to secure for the mar 
ket income poor a level of after-tax, or disposable, income that exceeds 
some minimum standard. They do this by distributing direct cash pay 
ments and providing essential goods.
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Citizens today, on the other hand, see something quite different from 
the simple need for income assistance when they think of the poor pop 
ulation. Contrary to when the welfare system was started, we now 
expect that able-bodied women with children should contribute to their 
own well-being through work. We have also come to believe that for 
able-bodied people, there should be some quid pro quo associated with 
the provision of income support. And, if those requiring help are not 
job-ready, some seem to believe in education and training, rather than 
direct cash support; others advocate temporary public help followed by 
a termination of assistance.
At an even more fundamental level than work behavior, nonpoor cit 
izens today expect minimum standards of civil behavior and responsi 
ble lifestyle decisions by those who receive public support. They are 
offended by dependency, teen out-of-wedlock births, homelessness, 
drug abuse and crime—all of which they see prevalent among the wel 
fare recipient population.
While the images may be colored by stereotypes and prejudice 
(these problems are also concentrated in the African-American and 
Hispanic populations), to a large slice of nonpoor Americans, many of 
those in the bottom tail of the distribution today are there because of 
irresponsible choices they have made: the choice to bear children out 
of wedlock as a teen, the choice not to complete high school, the deci 
sion to refuse minimum wage employment when it is available, the 
decision to abuse drugs and sell them, the willingness to run in gangs 
and to engage in crime and violence, often against other poor people. 
After all, the poor did not used to be like this. And while many may be 
willing to admit that economic and social factors, urban schools, and 
the barriers created by racial prejudice may make these choices a ratio 
nal response to the options available, they nevertheless seem to con 
clude that these socially costly and destructive outcomes are the result 
of choices encouraged by the welfare system.
If this characterization is true, the questions that people ask today 
about the current welfare system become more understandable. If 
recipients are able to engage in productive activity, why don't we 
require work as a condition of providing cash and in-kind assistance? 
If they are unable to break into regular jobs because of a lack of train 
ing or a lack of child care or health support, why don't we encourage 
them—or force them—to get whatever jobs they can so that they can
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accumulate the work experience necessary to advance? If they are hav 
ing additional children who can be supported only by taxpayer assis 
tance, or if they are working off the books, or drug-dealing when they 
should be learning, or opting not to marry in order to sustain public 
payments, or not requiring their kids to go to school, why should we 
simply provide support without attempting to change these behaviors? 
In short, changes in general social standards, changes in the charac 
teristics and behavior of the poor and welfare recipients, and changes 
in our expectations of them have created doubts about the wisdom of 
the welfare system as we know it.
Some Background on Poverty and Welfare Policy
Before getting into the specifics of the welfare reform debate, this 
section of the chapter presents some basic facts on poverty and wel 
fare. Table 1 provides an overview of antipoverty programs since 1970. 
The years in the table correspond to peaks in the business cycle (1989 
and 1992 are included for completeness).
The first two columns of the table show the number of persons with 
market incomes below the poverty line before and after cash transfers. 
Although not shown, in 1960, 39.9 million people (22.2 percent of the 
population) had after-cash transfer income below the poverty line. By 
1970, this number had fallen to 25.4 million (or 12.6 percent of the 
population). Some combination of economic expansion, demographic 
changes, increased coverage and generosity of the social security sys 
tem, and the War on Poverty/Great Society programs caused this 
improvement. Since 1973, however, the poverty population has 
increased sharply. The gain from 1979 to 1989 is particularly distress 
ing; the sustained period of economic growth from 1982 to 1990 failed 
to raise the economic position of the poorest among us. Contrary to 
earlier experience, this rising economic tide did not lift these boats, and 
as a result, the common belief in the antipoverty impacts of good mac- 
roeconomic performance has been shaken.
Columns 4 through 6 show federal expenditures on the largest cash 
or "near-cash" means-tested—or antipoverty—programs. Through 
these programs, the nation currently spends around 1 percent of GDP 
on families and individuals with incomes below the poverty line.
Table 1. Poverty Population and Real-Cash and Near-Cash Transfer Program Expenditures, Selected Years
Number of
pretax, 
pretransfer 
Year poor (1000s)
1970
1973
1979
1983
1989
1990
1991
1992
n.a.
n.a.
42,783
52,700
49,052
50,851
54,679
57,350
Persons in Percent of
official population in 
poverty official AFDC 
(1000s) poverty benefits'1
25,420
22,973
26,072
35,303
31,534
33,585
35,708
36,880
12.6
11.1
11.7
15.2
12.8
13.5
14.2
14.5
$15,051
22,382
19,382
17,975
18,120
18,529
19,319
20,431
Food 
stamp 
benefits
n.a.
$7,186a
11,184
16,585
13,760
15,717
18,463
21,884
SSI 
benefits'1
$10,627
10,801
13,672
13,247
16,640
17,277
18,520
21,258
Total 
benefits
$25,678
33,183
44,238
47,807
48,520
51,523
56,302
63,573
EITC 
expenditures
n.a.
n.a.
$3,966
2,528
7,462
7,437
9,689
11,783
Benefits as a 
percentage 
ofGDP
0.70
0.78
0.92
1.00
0.82
0.87
0.96
1.05
SOURCE U.S. Congress (1993, pp 678, 867, 1058, 1312-13, 1609), U S Bureau of the Census (1993a, p. xvm); Council of Economic Advisors (1994,
table B-l, p 268, table B-59, p. 335)
NOTE. Benefits in millions of 1992 dollars.
a Includes administrative costs of the program in 1973.
b Includes state and federal benefits.
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The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 
commonly referred to as "welfare," is the largest antipoverty income 
support program directed at families with children. The overwhelming 
bulk of recipients are single mothers and their children. The real value 
of aggregate AFDC benefits peaked around 1973; over the next ten 
years, real AFDC expenditures fell by almost 20 percent. Over the 
same period, the number of persons in families with incomes below the 
poverty line increased by 54 percent. Real AFDC expenditures have 
edged up since 1983. About 14 million people receive AFDC benefits, 
and two-thirds of them are children. AFDC spending accounts for 
about 1 percent of the federal budget, and about 2-3 percent of the bud 
gets of most states.
The decline in AFDC benefits has been more than offset, in the 
aggregate, by a rapid increase in expenditures on the food stamp pro 
gram, the nation's only antipoverty program available to all of the poor. 
There has been modest growth in the combined value of AFDC and 
food stamps.
In addition to these cash or near-cash benefit programs, a number of 
additional federal programs have significant antipoverty components. 
These include the medicaid program, public housing or housing assis 
tance, and the Head Start program.
Finally, in the next to last column, information on the earned income 
tax credit (EITC) is shown. The EITC is a refundable tax credit on 
earned income directed primarily toward low-income workers with 
children. It is a major antipoverty program administered on the tax side 
of the budget. While its cost was about $12 billion in 1992, by 1996, 
the EITC is expected to be the largest cash or near-cash program 
directed toward low-income families with children.
This constellation of existing tax and transfer measures represents 
an important contribution to improving the lives of the nation's most 
disadvantaged and to reducing the incidence of pretax and pretransfer 
poverty. The full set of programs existing in 1991 removed from pov 
erty nearly 20 million of the 55 million pretax and pretransfer poor; 
without these programs, the nation would have had a poverty rate of 
21.8 percent, but with them in place the actual poverty rate was 14 per 
cent. Without the programs in place, it would have taken over $160 bil 
lion (in 1991 dollars) to close the poverty gap; with them, the 
remaining poverty gap stood at about $52 billion.
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This synopsis of poverty and welfare programs provides the neces 
sary background for any sensible discussion of reform. However, this 
discussion cannot ignore how the U.S. economy has been evolving 
over the past twenty years. The simple fact is that the erosion of labor 
market opportunities for people with low levels of education has 
placed an enormous strain on the nation's antipoverty programs.
The figures in table 2, which show median incomes of men and 
women by their level of educational attainment, reflect the serious 
increase in inequality in the American economy. More important, they 
show the deterioration at the bottom of the distribution, which has con 
tributed to the growing gap among the rich and the poor. In 1973, the 
median male with one to three years of high school had about $24,000 
in income (in 1989 dollars); by 1989 the median worker with the same 
level of education had only $14,439 in income. Note that while the fall 
in income has been enormous for those with little education—both 
male and female—it has been greater for men than for women. Even 
so, the income level of women remains well below that for men.
Table 2. Median Income of Persons 25 and Over, by Educational 
Attainment and Gender, Selected Years, 1989 Dollars
Males
High school
Year
1967
1970
1973
1979
1983
1989
1-3 years
$22,858
23,442
24,079
18,697
15,138
14,439
4 years
$26,894
28,034
30,252
26,416
21,932
21,650
College 
4+ years
$39,186
40,527
41,065
36,636
35,188
37,553
Females
High school
1-3 years
$7,574
7,629
7,920
6,726
6,531
6,752
4 years
$10,800
10,866
11,087
9,085
9,326
10,439
College 
4+ years
$19,205
19,735
19,667
16,923
18,427
21,659
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990), for 1967-1983 figures, U S Bureau of the Census 
(1991); for 1989 figures.
I now want to consider the merits and implications of the two 
"reform" plans offered: the Clinton administration proposal and the 
proposal contained in the "Contract with America," which has served 
as the basis for the legislation passed by the Congress and signed into
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law by President Clinton in 1996. Though the currency of either plan is 
certainly open to question, both are likely to be important reference 
points over the next several years during which the new legislation will 
be implemented.
The Clinton Welfare Reform Proposal: Making Work Pay
It is into this maelstrom of political and economic pressures that the 
Clinton administration strode, promising to "end welfare as we know 
it." But exactly what is this plan, and how effective is it likely to be?
President Clinton's proposal was designed to "make work pay" 
through an expanded EITC, supplemented by child care assistance and 
job training. Indeed, a large step toward attaining this goal had already 
been taken by the time the President announced the remainder of his 
welfare reform plan. A major expansion of the earned income tax 
credit had been part of the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA93). By 1998 the program is projected to cost $24.5 billion, $7 
billion of which is the result of the 1993 expansion. For taxpayers with 
incomes in the lower earnings range of the credit, the expanded EITC 
can be thought of as a well-targeted increase in the minimum wage, to 
$5.95 per hour for families with two or more children, from $4.25 an 
hour. The expanded credit will deliver benefits to more than six million 
working taxpayers with incomes below the poverty line, will close the 
poverty gap by $6.4 billion, and will raise the incomes of over one mil 
lion taxpayers to a level above the poverty line.
The proposal of the Clinton administration was also designed to 
make parents responsible, in part through child support enforcement 
and requiring women who give birth to establish paternity in the hospi 
tal. It would make recipients experience "Workfare"—including educa 
tion and training—through a signed contract between recipients and 
government. It would discourage teen motherhood, by forcing teen 
moms to either live with their parents or send the check to the parents. 
It would change the "culture" of the welfare office by transforming 
caseworkers from check writers to counselors assessing capabilities and 
work out a training/education plan designed to achieve independence.
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Finally, the Clinton proposal would force recipients to leave welfare 
after some point; "two years and out" is its most popular manifestation. 
Those able to work will be forced to operate in a world in which 
income support is a temporary and transitional "help," a mechanism 
designed to enable people to get their lives in sufficient order to live 
independently, relying on the returns from their own efforts. When the 
time limit for support has been reached, recipients will be turned out to 
find their own way in the world of work, assisted by child care subsi 
dies and, of course, health coverage as a part of the president's health 
care reform proposal; if they are unable to find work, the government 
will presumably guarantee them a low-paying public service job (or, in 
some descriptions of the program, subsidize the private sector for pro 
viding jobs). However, this provision would have applied only to 
young recipients—those born after 1971—and then only to those with 
children older than one year. And, recipients not able to find a private 
sector job would be allowed to keep their public service job indefi 
nitely—if they play by the rules, continue to search for a job, and not 
decline a job if it is offered.
The analytical support of this plan by administration spokespeople 
was consistent. They did want to change the expectations of the poor 
and establish a new norm. They did want to threaten the loss of bene 
fits, in part because of the change in expectations that will result. At the 
same time, they sought to make jobs and working more attractive 
through supplements, services, and training. Their presentations made 
it clear that they saw health care reform as prior to welfare reform.
How Does the Clinton Plan Stack Up?
How do these elements of the Clinton proposal fare, especially in 
light of our critique of current policy? First, in my view, the expansion 
of the EITC is an extremely important, effective measure; it increases 
the return to work for taxpayers with children and does so in a coherent 
manner within the structure of the personal income tax. It will reduce 
poverty, and it has the right incentives.
Increasing efforts to collect and assure child support and to routinize 
the collection system are also to be commended. However, those who
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have studied this possibility—and who are its biggest advocates—sug 
gest that no more than a marginal increment in the available income 
support will accrue to most mothers now on welfare.
The provision for time-limited welfare, training and education 
through workfare, child and health care assistance, and a guaranteed 
public service job are, in my view, dangerous territory. While changing 
the rules and benefit structure of welfare programs to minimize the 
rewards available for dysfunctional behavior is one thing, effectively 
canceling income support is quite another.
The fact is that most current recipients lack the basic capabilities to 
work themselves out of poverty on their own, even if they were to work 
full time, full year at the wage rate that their education, experience, and 
health characteristics would command. Take a look at table 3. Women 
recipients of AFDC are not a picture of job readiness. Nearly one-half 
of their children are less than five years of age, nearly one-half of them 
are high school dropouts, and less than 10 percent are working at all.
Table 3. Characteristics of AFDC Caseload, 1979-1991
Characteristic
Ages of children
Under 3
3 to 5
6 to 11
12 and over
Education of mother
8th grade or less3
1-3 years high school3
4 years high school3
Some college3
College graduate11
Unknown
Mother's employment status
Full-time job
Part-time job
Cases with reported earnings
March 1979
18.9
17.5
330
29.8
18.2
39.8
36.0
5.2
0.8
47.8
8.7
5.4
12.8
1986
21.0
21 1
32.4
24.3
11.9
355
42.9
8.4
1.2
59.7
1.6
4.2
7.5
1991
24.8
21.4
32.6
21.4
11.2
35.1
40.7
12.2
0.8
49.9
2.2
4.2
7.9
SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means, 1993 Green Book, pp 696-97.
a Percentage distribution among mothers whose educational attainment is known.
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Figure 1, taken from a recent study by Gary Burtless at the Brook- 
ings Institution, gives a sense of what these women would be able to 
earn if left on their own in the regular labor market. The bottom two 
lines show what former recipients have earned after leaving welfare. 
The top line is the most revealing one. It shows the amount of earnings 
of women with the capabilities of those who are now welfare recipi 
ents, if they were to work full time, full year. This level of earnings 
would leave the bulk of these families below the poverty line, even 
assuming that they could find such full-time jobs, and moreover it fails 
to recognize that the bulk of them have children who would require 
child care assistance were these mothers to work such hours.
Figure 1. Actual and Predicted Earnings among Women Who Received 
AFDC in 1979-1982
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SOURCE The Work Alternative, Nightengale and Haveman, eds , p 84, Washington, 
D C . Urban Institute Press (1995). Used with permission
While numerous training or welfare-to-work programs appear to 
pass a benefit-cost test, it is but a dream that the sort of training and 
remedial education that will be offered through "workfare" will make 
these people job-ready and economically independent. Moreover, the 
total costs of operating a reasonable public service jobs program are 
sufficiently high — in the neighborhood of $12,000 to $15,000 per
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worker per year—that current budgetary constraints insure that the 
demand for slots would far exceed the supply.
The "Contract with America"—Another Approach
Not long after the announcement of the Clinton plan, the midterm 
elections of 1994 were held, and both houses of Congress changed 
from being controlled by the Democrats to being controlled by the 
Republicans. The new majority party had run on a multipronged plat 
form, called the "Contract with America," which included a welfare 
reform proposal.
The Republican approach to welfare was quite different from any 
that had been suggested heretofore. Although its specifics became 
modified in the process of congressional debate, its basic approach 
remained constant. In particular, the congressional proposal would:
• Turn over to the states—in the form of "block grants"— the fund 
ing for welfare (AFDC) that the federal government had been pro 
viding (less some amount to reflect expected efficiencies) and 
allow the states to do whatever they wanted with poor people in 
their jurisdictions. Moreover, the amount handed over would be 
kept constant for five years. As a result of this, poor people in vari 
ous categories would no longer be entitled to support.
•Along with the "block grants," the federal government would 
impose a variety of constraints on how the states could use the 
money. In particular, they:
- could not provide benefits to teenaged nonmarried mothers.
- could not provide an increase in support to mothers who had 
another child.
- could not provide support to either legal or illegal immigrants, 
with a few exceptions.
- would deny benefits for life to any child who was born to an 
unmarried mother who gave birth while a recipient.
- would beef up child support enforcement, much along the lines 
of the Clinton proposal.
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- would impose a 60-month (or 5-year) cumulative limit on the 
time that recipients could secure support from the state program. 
Unlike the Clinton program, this limit would not be accompa 
nied by support for education, training, child care, or public jobs 
once the time limit was encountered.
-would cut back on funding for other programs helping low- 
income people, such as food stamps, medicaid, and Head Start, 
and would seek to scale back the EITC.
How Does the "Contract" Stack Up?
Clearly, this congressional approach begins from a quite different 
and far more harsh view of the safety net programs in place in this 
country designed to help the least well-off among us. While one might 
view this harsh stance as sending a lesson regarding self-sufficiency 
and responsibility to adults who are recipients, it will inevitably carry 
adverse consequences for their children. Moreover, because the bulk of 
the people who will be affected by these harsh measures are African- 
American or Hispanic, the impacts of these measures across racial 
boundaries, may be quite unequal.
A variety of other concerns are also relevant in assessing this 
approach. First, some of the specifics of the program appear to be 
based on simple ideology, apart from any research knowledge or facts. 
For example, there is simply no evidence that the current system, 
which increases support along with family size, has encouraged addi 
tional births among the recipient population. One would be hard 
pressed to find a reputable researcher advocating the opposite position. 
Second, the notion that there is substantial money that can be saved 
seems to rest on a hope, rather than evidence. There is simply no evi 
dence suggesting that efficiencies of the amount claimed are available 
to any new administrative procedure, whether state-based or not. Third, 
the constitutionality of the measures as they pertain to legal immigrants 
is an open question. These people, after all, are required to pay taxes, 
and are drafted into the nation's military when additional personnel are 
required. Finally, by failing to provide support for training, education, 
child care and job search—and by not requiring work-related efforts
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while receiving benefits, the "Contract" proposals seem weaker on 
work than does the Clinton plan.
This discussion leaves an overriding question regarding the longer 
term impact of the measures in the "Contract": What will happen to 
those recipients and their families who lose their benefits? While no 
one really knows, if I were pushed into a corner I would speculate that 
10 to 15 percent of them would make a successful transition into the 
world of work and become self-sufficient, but at a low level. Another 
70 percent or so would "cope"—they and their children would be 
severely disadvantaged, but they would adjust by combining house 
holds or moving in with relatives, or they would work some in inter 
mittent and informal jobs. They would be poorer and even less capable 
of nurturing their children, but we wouldn't be vividly confronted by 
their hardships. We would only see the effects on their children a 
decade or two down the road. The remainder—say, 10 to 15 percent of 
those losing benefits—would become truly destitute. The effects on 
them would be obvious; homelessness would be only the most visible 
effect. The stock of recipients who now face benefit cutoff because of a 
five-year rule is about 1 million; 10 to 15 percent of this number is 
about 100,000 to 150,000. On average, each of these recipients has two 
children; hence, we are considering 300,000 to 450,000 people who 
would be visibly destitute. Surely, some of these would find their way 
onto the rolls of the Supplemental Security Income program—at fed 
eral government expense—or into the foster care system, at state and 
local expense.
Yet, it is the basic approach of this stern "Contract with America" 
proposal that is reflected in the new legislation passed by Congress, 
and signed—albeit reluctantly—by President Clinton. While some of 
the "Contract's" harsh edges have been sanded down, the entitlement 
of welfare has been eroded, block grants to states provided, work man 
dated, and prohibitions on assistance to various groups imposed.
Is the Real Problem "The Welfare System," or Is It the Collapse 
of the Bottom End of the Labor Market?
Unless I am wrong, the most critical problem of both the Clinton 
proposal and the Contract with America is their common presumption
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that the least able groups of the nation's working-age population can be 
successfully coerced into that niche of the labor market that has per 
formed most poorly. As I have already noted, the low-wage sector is 
already struggling to absorb a large and growing flow of immigrants, 
both legal and illegal, as well as a rapid increase in female labor force 
participants, many of whom have few skills and little experience. If 
ever there was "swimming against the tide," this is it.
It is my strong judgment that these plans fail to address adequately 
the damper that the low end of the labor market places on opportunities 
for low-educated workers. The implicit assumption seems to be that the 
low-wage labor market can, without major dislocation, absorb up to 
two million additional low-skilled welfare recipients over the next few 
years. I have serious doubts that this is possible.
I would urge readers to note that there are interesting, high-potential 
policy ideas available for both increasing the private demand for low- 
skill labor and making these low-paying jobs more attractive. I am cha 
grined that neither the administration nor the Republican Congress has 
paid more attention to the potential of some of these options.
After all, numerous possibilities have been studied, and some have 
come away with rather high marks. One possibility would be a pro 
gram modeled after the New Jobs Tax Credit, a measure that we actu 
ally had in place in the 1970s. The NJTC offers a tax credit in the range 
of $4,000 to $7,000 to employers who increase their employment level 
over some base level in the previous year. Because the credit is a flat 
amount, it forms a higher percentage in the wage bill for less-skilled 
workers than for more highly paid workers. It tilts the hiring decision 
towards lowest-wage workers.
Observers are convinced that a nontrivial increase in job creation for 
low-skill workers can be generated through this arrangement at a rather 
low cost to the Treasury, especially if the program is taken seriously, 
and publicized and administered efficiently. I would note that I am 
referring here to a universal program and not to the targeted jobs tax 
credit program.
A second possibility, this time on the supply side of the market, 
would be a wage rate subsidy. This program would complement an 
expanded EITC and make work pay even more directly. In this plan, a 
target wage rate, assume, say $10 an hour, would be set. Any worker 
taking a job at less than this amount, say $6 an hour, would be subsi-
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dized at a rate equal to 50 percent of the difference between the actual 
wage of $6 and the $10 target. Take-home pay would be $8 in this 
example: the $6 per hour market wage and the $2 wage rate subsidy. 
The effect of the plan would be to simply and effectively give low- 
wage workers, all low-wage workers, a labor-market advantage. It 
would make regular private sector work at low wages more attractive 
than it is now. Again, a number of potential concerns would have to be 
worked out, and the effects of the measure on the overall level of the 
market wage would have to be monitored.
The combination of this pair of employment incentives would 
improve the operation of the low-skilled labor market by generating 
ongoing demand- and supply-side pressure for the creation of jobs for 
marginal workers at reasonable cost. As such, it would equalize 
employment opportunities. By targeting the additional employment on 
underutilized segments of the labor market, national income could be 
increased without significant inflationary pressure. The combination 
will fundamentally alter the wage structure in private labor markets, 
raising the take-home pay of low-skilled workers relative to those with 
more secure positions in the labor market. The cost of an employment 
subsidy arrangement such as this would be substantially lower than 
providing equivalent jobs through public service employment, and 
lower still than dealing with the aftermath of the drastic cutbacks envi 
sioned by the "Contract with America." Surely these suggestions 
should not be excluded from any serious national debate on poverty 
and poverty policy.
A Few Final Reflections
Let me conclude with a few final reflections on poverty and welfare 
in the United States today.
My first reflection is that welfare reform policy is no longer antipov- 
erty policy. No longer do observers emphasize that the ultimate goal of 
all of this activity is to make the lives of poor people better than they 
are now. Getting people to work is equated with making their lives bet 
ter; perhaps this might happen in the long run, but for sure, not in the 
short term.
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A second reflection concerns institutions that no longer work in 
American society, and difficulty of government in replacing them. I 
have been struck by the enormity of the task of replacing families, 
churches, and neighborhoods by government. I am struck by how diffi 
cult and expensive it is to bring a young person, a child, to a position in 
which "work will work." Perhaps there is a lesson in our own personal 
experience that would be of use to government. How do we do it for 
our kids? Well, first we give them lots of education with monitoring 
and advice and expectations and parental participation in schools. 
Then, when they finish their schooling, we support them for a time 
while they get their heads together. Sometimes they engage in job 
search, sometimes they ski, sometimes they travel. Following this, we 
actively and in a one-on-one relationship, help them with job search. 
We help them prepare a resume, we put them into touch with friends 
and acquaintances, we help them to prepare for job interviews—all so 
they can find their own special niche in the world of work. Finally, we 
often support them in moving to another location, often far from our 
home if that is where the best opportunity for them is.
The main lesson, I fear, is that doing this effectively is costly, very 
costly. There is simply no way to do it on the cheap. The realization of 
this truth makes more distressing our talk of making welfare recipients 
self-sufficient with a reform that will at the same time save resources 
devoted to low-income families and their children.
A third reflection also relates to changes in the institutions that sup 
port and nurture the young. Like many other social scientists, I too am 
distressed by the growing incidence of out-of-wedlock births. But I am 
no less distressed by the Draconian measures regarding it often advo 
cated by observers such as Charles Murray. There are, it seems to me, 
few good options here. There is moral suasion; there is denial of bene 
fits; there is the requirement that teen mothers stay with their parents, 
perhaps frequently in a relationship that neither parents nor children 
will find productive; or there is keeping going as we are. Nothing looks 
very good, yet doing nothing seems wrong as well. I am simply trou 
bled by what appears to be a near total lacunae concerning what appro 
priate and effective policy in this area might be.
In summary then, any cogent debate of welfare policy must begin 
with the recognition that a new economic, social, and ethical order is in 
place. This reality would seem to rule out certain options—such as a
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negative income tax—despite their theoretical and practical appeal. 
However, the mandating of work for millions of low-skilled people in a 
labor market environment in which relative demands and wage rates 
are falling seems unworkable, though consistent with the new reality. If 
this is ultimately what "welfare reform" is all about, an increase in 
poverty will be the result, and the next generation will experience all of 
the correlates of "growing up poor." If welfare reform reflecting this 
new reality takes the form of such work mandates, measures designed 
to improve the performance of the low-skill labor market would seem 
to be a necessary and natural complement.
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In the 1960s, the U.S. economy was flying high. Between 1961 and 
1969, we experienced the longest and strongest economic expansion in 
U.S. history. The economy grew by an average of 4.3 percent per year, 
while unemployment was at 3.5 percent by the end of the decade. At 
the same time, the share of the population below the poverty line fell 9 
percentage points, from 22 percent in 1960 to 13 percent by 1970.' 
Most economic analyses indicate that it was the booming economic 
growth that reduced poverty in the 1960s.
Now fast-forward to the 1980s. After two back-to-back recessions 
during 1980 and 1982, there was a strong and rapid recovery. From 
1983 through 1989, the U.S. economy experienced its second longest 
and strongest expansion, topped only by the 1960s. Economic growth 
during these years averaged 3.7 percent per year. Unemployment fell 
from over 10 percent in December 1982 to slightly over 5 percent by 
1989. But the poverty rate, which was over 15 percent at the beginning 
of the expansion of the 1980s fell only modestly. By 1990, after six 
years of economic expansion, it had declined only 2.4 percentage 
points and was still above its level of a decade before.
Now move forward again into the 1990s. A mild recession in 1990- 
1991 was followed by strong aggregate growth in 1992-1993. Not sur 
prisingly, poverty rates rose in 1990-1991. Very surprisingly, poverty 
continued to rise in 1992-1993. The poverty rate, 15.1 percent, was 
very near where it was in 1983 at the end of a sharp steep recession. 
For the first time in modern U.S. economic history, economic expan 
sion was associated with increases in the share of poor persons in the 
population.
This paper is about what happened over these years that caused eco 
nomic growth to decline as an effective antipoverty tool. The first part
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compares the expansions of the 1960s and the 1980s and indicates why 
economic growth had far less effect on the income distribution in the 
1980s than two decades earlier. We will discover that the primary cul 
prit is a change in the demand for less-skilled labor that has driven 
down wages among less-skilled workers. The second section discusses 
some of the reasons for these labor market changes, and the third sec 
tion discusses their political and policy implications.
The Death of "Trickle Down Economics"
It has been an axiom of public policy and political rhetoric that eco 
nomic growth helps the poor. More than one president has claimed that 
"the best thing we can do for the poor is to make the economy grow." 
This strategy, often referred to as "trickle down economics," is 
extremely attractive, because it promises that we can fight poverty 
without substantial costs. Economic growth is expected to make mid 
dle-income Americans better off at the same time as it decreases pov 
erty. This is a win-win solution to poverty, requiring no higher taxes on 
one group in order to redistribute to another. Unfortunately, this solu 
tion has been largely ineffective over the past fifteen years.
Figure 1 shows both the poverty rate and the size of the overall 
economy as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the most 
frequently used measure of overall economic capacity, from 1960 to 
1993. 2 Between 1961 and 1969, the U.S. economy experienced its 
longest economic boom, as can be seen from the steep upward rise in 
GDP. Poverty fell 9 percentage points during that period. Between 
1983 and 1989, the U.S. economy experienced its second-longest 
expansion. Poverty declined only 2.4 percentage points during that 
period, and remained well above its historic low of 11.1 percent in 
1973. This is reinforced in the 1990s, when strong economic growth is 
associated with increases in poverty.
One measure of how surprising these changes are can be seen by 
going back to an economics article published in the mid-1980s by Alan 
Blinder and myself (Blank and Blinder 1986). In that article, we esti 
mated the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and the 
overall poverty rate. Using data from 1959 (when official poverty num-
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bers begin) to 1983, we were able to track poverty based on the core 
unemployment rate, the inflation rate, the share of government trans 
fers to the poor, and several other macroeconomic indicators. We can 
use that historical relationship between the macro economy and pov 
erty to predict the poverty rate over the 1980s, based on what actually 
happened in the macro economy. Our evidence would have predicted 
that by 1989 the poverty rate should have been down to 9.3 percent, 
driven by declining unemployment and low inflation. In reality, the 
actual poverty rate was 12.8 percent, much higher. 3
Figure 1. U.S. Poverty Rate vs. Gross Domestic Product
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This exercise provides clear evidence of two things: First, no econo 
mist should be so foolish as to engage in economic predictions. Sec 
ond, the historical relationship between macroeconomic growth and 
changes in poverty has fundamentally deteriorated.
Over the past five years, I have been involved in several research 
projects, exploring these changes in the relationship between economic 
growth and poverty.4 Let me first indicate what the causes of the slug 
gish decline in poverty are not. While the following stories are often 
told, they turn out not to explain what is happening:
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1. The problem is not that we are mismeasuring poverty in the 
1980s and 1990s. Poverty rates are based only on cash income 
and do not consider what we call "in-kind" transfers. In-kind 
transfers include noncash public assistance programs, such as 
food stamps or housing assistance. While it is true that in-kind 
transfers have expanded among the poor, most of this expansion 
occurred in the 1970s, when such programs were increasing rap 
idly. Poverty rates that include in-kind income decline by almost 
exactly the same amount over the expansion of the 1980s as do 
official poverty rates. This is perhaps not surprising since in-kind 
income did not grow in real terms over this time period.
2. The problem is not legislative changes in eligibility and benefits 
in public assistance programs. Some have suggested that the cuts 
Ronald Reagan implemented in the early 1980s offset the effects 
of economic growth. While it is true that welfare payments 
declined in real terms for poor families throughout the 1980s, this 
had little effect on poverty, largely because public assistance does 
little to actually move families above the poverty line. Most pub 
lic assistance payments move recipients closer to the official pov 
erty line, but the benefits are low enough that few families 
actually escape poverty because of public benefit payments. (The 
elderly, to whom we provide much more generous benefits, are an 
exception to this. Government assistance moves a substantial 
number of elderly persons and couples out of poverty. But the 
elderly were largely unaffected by the cuts of the early 1980s.)
3. The problem is not the changing demographic composition of the 
poor. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, the composition of the 
poor changed substantially. The share of the elderly declined, as 
did the share of poor married-couple families. An increasing 
share of the poor were single-parent families, typically single 
mothers. As it turns out, however, single-mother families are at 
least as responsive (or nonresponsive) to economic growth as 
other groups. If the composition of the poor had remained con 
stant from the early 1960s through the 1980s, the poverty rate 
would have been just as unresponsive to the macro economy of 
the 1980s.
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So what did happen? Let's start by discussing why economic growth 
would be expected to decrease poverty in the first place. Earnings, the 
most important component in most families' income, are the result of 
labor market effort multiplied by wages. How are these affected by the 
economic cycle?
The primary effect of economic growth on the distribution of 
income occurs through the availability of jobs. When the economy 
expands, employment grows and the demand for workers increases. 
Those who are unemployed, employed part-time, or not working at all, 
are most likely to benefit from employment expansions. And unem 
ployed, part-time, and discouraged workers are disproportionately 
likely to be less-skilled individuals in low-income families. Those who 
are working 40 to 50 hours a week are typically unable to benefit as 
much from employment growth. In March 1993, when overall unem 
ployment was 7 percent, unemployment among high school dropouts 
was 15 percent, among high school graduates it was 8 percent, while 
among college graduates it was just over 3 percent. 5 These unemploy 
ment differentials across skill levels have been relatively constant for 
many years in the U.S. economy.
Thus, when the economy expands, the main reason why those in 
families at the bottom of the income distribution catch up, relative to 
those in the middle, is that they gain more from the employment 
expansion that accompanies an economic boom. This clearly happened 
in the 1960s, when both the probability of working and weeks of work 
among the employed expanded more rapidly among persons in low- 
income families than in higher-income families. But it also happened 
in the 1980s. The evidence indicates that adults in low-income house 
holds took advantage of growing employment opportunities in the 
1980s even more than they did in the earlier decades. Work effort was 
more responsive to changes in the economy in the 1980s than in the 
1960s. If we look only at the growth in work behavior, we would have 
expected poverty to fall faster in the 1980s.
If labor market effort expanded as much in the 1980s as the 1960s, 
the only remaining factor is wages. In the 1960s, real wages expanded 
throughout the income distribution. GDP growth of 1 percent in the 
1960s was correlated with a $2.18 increase in real weekly wages 
among workers in low-wage families. This expansion in wages rein 
forced the growth in employment occurring at the same time, so that
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workers both expanded their hours of work and earned more every 
hour. The result was that poverty plummeted during that decade.
Among the poorest groups in the population in the 1980s, however, 
real wages actually fell with economic growth. Both high school drop- 
outs and high school graduates have experienced a steady decline in 
their earnings starting in about 1979 that has continued through the 
past fifteen years. The result was that the poor worked more during the 
economic expansion of the 1980s, but earned less per hour over time. 
Unlike the 1960s, these two effects offset each other. While poverty did 
decline, the decline was much more modest than expected as falling 
real wages limited the economic gains that increased labor market 
involvement should have produced. Both my own research and the 
research of others suggests that the difference between the responsive- 
ness of poverty and of the income distribution to economic growth 
between the 1960s and the more recent decade is entirely due to these 
wage changes.
What's Happening to Wages?
Table 1 shows wage changes among men and women at different 
skill levels over the past twenty-five years. In order to abstract away 
from questions of changes in work effort, the table shows weekly 
wages (inflation adjusted) among nonelderly men and women who 
worked full time year-round. The decade between 1969 and 1979 was a 
bad decade for all workers. A series of recessions combined with high 
inflation rates left virtually all workers with lower wages in 1979 than 
they had earned ten years earlier. Since 1979, however, there has been 
sharp divergence in the wage changes experienced by more- and less- 
skilled workers. Average weekly wages among men who are high 
school dropouts have fallen by 15.6 percent, while they have risen by 
15.7 percent among men who hold college degrees. The distribution of 
earnings has also widened among women, although this is largely 
because of big increases in earnings among more educated women. 
Women without a high school degree have faced virtually stagnant 
weekly earnings since 1969, while women with college degrees have 
seen their earnings grow by 31 percent. A growing body of literature
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has documented these changed among many groups using a wide vari 
ety of data sources. There are two primary conclusions that emerge 
from this literature.6
Table 1. Average Weekly Earnings by Years of School and Sex Among 
Nonelderly Adults Who Work Full Time and Full Year
Education level 1969
Less than a high school 
degree $489
Percent change
High school degree 601
Percent change
Post-high school training, 
no college degree 699
Percent change
College or higher degree 911
Percent change
Men
1979
$474
-3.1
565
-6.0
626
-10.4
841
-7.7
1992
$400
-15.6
536
-5.1
641
+2.4
973
+157
Women
1969 1979
$279 $281
+0.7
340 335
-1.5
388 377
-2.8
523 489
-6.5
1992
$284
+1.1
379
+13.1
451
+19.6
642
+31.3
SOURCE: Tabulations from the Current Population Surveys, March 1970, 1980, and 1993, based 
on the civilian population ages 18-65 Inflation adjustments are based on the GDP deflator.
First, these wage changes are spread throughout the economy. They 
are occurring among men and women in virtually all industries and 
occupations. Less-skilled men in both manufacturing and nonmanufac- 
turing industries have experienced similar real wage declines. 
Although the trends are strongest among younger workers, they are 
occurring among older workers as well.
Second, as is visible in table 1, there appear to be substantial gender 
differences in these trends. While the least-skilled women have not 
experienced wage increases, neither have they experienced the wage 
decline of their less-skilled brothers. While this has helped close the 
female-to-male wage gap, presumably those who wanted to bring 
men's and women's wages closer together did not want to do it by 
decreasing men's wages. It is also worth noting that wages among less- 
skilled women remain far below those of men. The average male high 
school dropout earned $400/week if he worked full time year-round in
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1993, while the average female high school dropout earned only $2847 
week at full-time work.
What has caused these wage changes? That question is much dis 
cussed among economists, and a growing literature is attempting to 
explain various causal forces. In general, most analysts agree that it is 
changes in the demand for more- versus less-skilled labor that is driv 
ing these trends. In other words, employer demand for less-skilled 
labor has been falling over the last fifteen years, and this is driving 
down wages among this group. Two particular economy-wide changes 
have been strongly linked to these wage changes: the growing impor 
tance of international competition to U.S. firms and changing technol 
ogy. Let's look at each of these in turn.
The Growing Inte nationalization of the U.S. Economy
As the U.S. economy is increasingly linked with the world econ 
omy, U.S. workers are in competition with workers around the globe. 
In this global labor market, skilled workers in the United States have a 
comparative advantage. The United States has more skilled, college- 
educated workers than any other country in the world. Less-skilled 
U.S. workers, however, are presumably at a comparative disadvantage 
relative to less-skilled workers in industrializing countries, such as 
those in the Pacific rim countries. Because the cost of living and the 
wage levels of less-skilled workers are substantially higher in the 
United States than elsewhere, demand for U.S. less-skilled labor might 
be expected to decrease while demand for less-skilled labor in lower- 
wage countries would rise. 7
The evidence indicates that growth in international economic com 
petition is not adequate by itself to fully explain U.S. wage changes. 
Those industries that have been experiencing rapid growth in interna 
tional competition have not necessarily experienced greater declines in 
wages among less-skilled workers. But there is evidence that this trend 
is at least one of the causal reasons behind these shifts.
Changing Technology in the U.S. Economy
The other story for which there is substantial evidence is the possi 
bility of technology shifts that have been demand-increasing for more
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skilled workers and demand-decreasing for less-skilled workers. 8 The 
rapid spread of computer-based technology in all industries and occu 
pations is often mentioned as an example. In manufacturing industries, 
"smart" machines mean that these companies hire more computer pro 
grammers and computer-literate production line overseers and fewer 
workers to perform repetitive labor. In the service industries, the rapid 
spread of personal computers has decreased clerical demand and 
replaced many persons in less-skilled filing and data entry positions.
There is evidence to support both of these explanations for the wage 
changes of the past fifteen years, and almost surely both of them are 
happening at once. These changes are also linked to a variety of other 
institutional changes that are correlated with declining wages among 
the less skilled. For instance, union jobs continue to disappear in the 
United States, in part because of the economic pressures of changing 
trade and technology. Since unions typically raise the wages of the 
least skilled, this accounts for about one-fifth of the decline in wages 
among less-skilled workers. 9
The most discouraging aspect of these two explanations is that nei 
ther of them promise any reversal of these wage trends. If anything, 
virtually all economists who have looked at these issues predict that the 
current trends toward a more internationalized economy and increasing 
use of "smart" technology, will continue in the near future. This means 
further declines in the earning ability of less-skilled workers.
Policy Implications
There are two major policy implications that emerge from the above 
discussion, both of them posing serious challenges to those who want 
to run effective policies to combat poverty in the United States.
Implication 1: Economic growth is unlikely to be an effective 
antipoverty tool in the near future.
For the past fifteen years, the employment expansions that occur 
when the economy grows have been offset by declines in real wages 
among less-skilled workers. As a result, the antipoverty "kick" that 
economic growth provided in earlier decades has not been available. To
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the extent that these wage trends are likely to continue, it is unreason 
able to expect economic expansions during the 1990s to have substan 
tial antipoverty effects.
Economic growth has historically been the most attractive antipov 
erty tool available. It provided broad-based income redistribution to 
low-income families at a time when the overall economic pie is grow 
ing. Thus, it required few hard political choices. In particular, it did not 
require higher taxes on middle- and upper-income families in order to 
provide services to lower-income families. There were also no admin 
istrative or overhead costs associated with a decline in poverty spurred 
by economic growth, since no government-run programs were 
required.
If economic growth is no longer available, this leaves us with two 
markedly less politically attractive alternatives. The first alternative is 
to pursue broad-based income redistribution through national cash- 
transfer programs for low-income families. This was originally pro 
posed by Richard Nixon, who wanted to replace many small antipov 
erty programs with a nationally based (albeit relatively low) cash 
guarantee for the poorest families. While his plan was enacted for eld 
erly families and resulted in the Supplemental Security Income pro 
gram which provides substantial cash redistribution to elderly and 
disabled persons, it was politically unpalatable for other poor families. 
If anything, since Nixon's time, cash income redistribution has become 
even less politically viable in the United States. In the current environ 
ment, the push has been to decrease cash transfers to the nonelderly 
even further.
The second alternative is to give up on broad-based redistributional 
programs and instead work to design targeted programs that provide 
specific services to clearly defined groups of persons. This would 
include such programs as Headstart, food stamps, housing assistance, 
or employment and training efforts. These programs often link specific 
behavioral requirements to benefits. For instance, parents as well as 
children are required to actively participate in Headstart activities, 
while employment and training programs typically impose attendance 
or effort requirements on participants.
The welfare reform conversations over the last decade have been 
focused on how to effectively implement this second alternative. 
Extensive discussion at the federal and state level has focused on such
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issues as which groups to target, which behavioral requirements to 
impose, and how to efficiently provide these services to the targeted 
recipients.
In contrast to economic growth, such antipoverty efforts require 
extensive governmental planning and management. An organizational 
structure must be established to run programs and verify eligibility. In 
addition, such services clearly cost money up front. The administrative 
costs of implementing and managing these programs are often substan 
tial and usually cost more than broad-based cash redistribution efforts.
Much of the frustration with our antipoverty system has been a frus 
tration with such targeted, heavily managed services. Major discussion 
is occurring about how to streamline these programs to make them 
more efficient and to ensure that they treat more participants more 
effectively. Such discussion was perhaps inevitable in a world where 
targeted service-provision programs provide the major effort against 
poverty. Clearly, the ineffectiveness of overall economic growth as an 
antipoverty tool has left us with much less politically palatable alterna 
tives.
Implication 2: Jobs alone will not solve poverty.
The other implication of the recent labor market changes is that 
employment is a less-effective way to escape poverty. Compared to 
thirty years ago, moving people out of poverty by moving them into 
employment is much harder. This is true for two reasons.
First, the changes in wages among less-skilled workers means that 
jobs pay less. Full-time work at the minimum wage provides only 
$8500, while the poverty line for a family of three is $12,500. Thus, 
efforts to move low-income adults out of poverty via employment will 
require more than just finding a job. Increases in employment will 
increase earnings, but for many low-income workers, this will not 
move them above the poverty line. Hence, in addition to programs 
designed to move people into jobs, we also have programs that supple 
ment earnings by collecting child support from absent fathers, by sub 
sidizing child care, or by supplementing wages through the Earned 
Income Tax Credit. Clearly, this costs more.
Second, as a growing share of the poor are single parents, this also 
limits the effectiveness of employment-based strategies, even in the 
absence of wage deterioration. Single parents often face more time
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constraints. They must act as the sole parent for their children as well 
as the primary family earner, making it harder for them to locate and 
keep a full-time job. In addition, many single parents must earn enough 
not just to cover their living expenses, but also to cover child care 
expenses. This increases the level of wages they need to make employ 
ment an effective strategy for escaping poverty. 10
The United States has long focused on economic self-sufficiency as 
the preferred way out of poverty, at least among families headed by 
nonelderly adults. Our reluctance to provide cash assistance mirrors 
our insistence that the best way to help the poor is to assist them into 
employment in the mainstream economy. Unfortunately, when the jobs 
available to less-skilled adults pay less and less over time, the 
"employment strategy" becomes a harder one to implement as a way to 
assist families out of poverty.
The decline in real wages among less-skilled workers over the past 
fifteen years has seriously limited our ability to address poverty 
through government action. On the one hand, these changes have 
meant that we can no longer rely on economic expansions to do some 
of our work for us, decreasing poverty without explicit policies or pro 
grams on the part of the government. On the other hand, these changes 
have made it harder for us to operate targeted programs aimed at 
increasing employment and earnings among the poor. Given this, it is 
perhaps not surprising that there is a sense of frustration about U.S. 
antipoverty efforts. Let's be clear where the source of the problem lies, 
however. What have changed most significantly in the last fifteen years 
have been the economy and the labor market for poor workers. This 
makes the task harder for all who would design public programs to 
combat poverty. Not impossible, but harder.
NOTES
1. The poverty rate is the share of persons in the population who live in households whose 
cash income falls below the official U.S poverty line. Poverty lines vary with household size.
2. Figure 1 puts GDP in 1993 dollars, which is to say that it is inflation-adjusted and expressed 
in terms of 1993 purchasing power
3 These estimates are report in Blank (1993).
4. The following discussion is based on the evidence in Blank (1993) and Blank and Card 
(1993). Supporting evidence is also presented in Cutler and Katz (1991).
5. Data tabulated from the Current Population Survey tape, March 1993.
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6. For a fuller discussion of these wage trends, see Levy and Murnane (1992), Danziger and 
Gottschalk (1993), or Juhn et al (1993). For a discussion of the broader set of labor market 
changes that have affected less-skilled workers, see Blank (1995)
7 For evidence on the impact of trade competition on wage differentials, see Katz and Mur 
phy (1992), Murphy and Welch (1993), and Sachs and Shatz (1994)
8 For evidence on the impact of changing technology on wages, see Bound and Johnson 
(1992), Davis and Haitiwanger (1991), or Berman, Bound, and Gnhches (1993)
9. See Freeman (1993) or Card (1992).
10 For a further discussion of the implications of these changes on employment-based strate 
gies, see Blank (1994)
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Regional Poverty and Inequality 
in the United States
John P. Formby 
University of Alabama
Poverty and income inequality are related, but distinct, aspects of 
the size distribution of income within a society. At the outset, it is 
important to understand the difference and relationship between these 
concepts. Poverty and inequality can be explained and illustrated by 
using a simple ordered income distribution. Before doing this, how 
ever, it is helpful to provide some basic intuition concerning poverty 
and inequality that corresponds to widely held views of disparities in 
income and wealth. The conversation supposedly took place between 
F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway concerning the differences 
in the behavior of ordinary Americans and the wealthy. Fitzgerald is 
reported to have said, "You know Ernest, rich people are different 
from us." Hemingway replied, "You're right, rich people have more 
money than we do." From the perspective of the economist, Heming 
way was correct. It is income and wealth that matter, and they are at 
the essence of both poverty and inequality. The fact that some people 
have larger shares of the income and wealth of a society and others 
have smaller shares gives rise to the basic notion of economic inequal 
ity. The individuals and families with the smallest shares may be, but 
are not necessarily, poor. Poverty arises when the levels of income and 
wealth are so low that the individuals are unable to acquire the market 
basket of goods that are deemed essential for a minimally decent stan 
dard of living.
Some Basic Concepts of Poverty and Inequality
The basic ideas underlying poverty and inequality, which are 
advanced in a very informal manner above, suggest that income ine 
quality is a relative income concept, whereas poverty is an absolute
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income concept. While these are not the only approaches to defining 
and measuring poverty and inequality, they are the most widely used, 
especially in the United States. In fact, an absolute income definition is 
officially incorporated into the statutory definition of poverty in the 
United States, whereas relative income inequality is the dominant per 
spective adopted by both policy makers and academic researchers 
around the world. The difference between relative income and absolute 
income and between inequality and poverty can be made clear with a 
simple income distribution. An income distribution is merely a list of 
incomes, or more formally a vector of incomes, of a group of individu 
als, families, or households. To illustrate the key concepts, two popula 
tion groups that reside in region N and S are considered. To keep things 
simple, it is assumed that there are only five individuals in each region. 
The incomes are ordered from lowest to highest and shown in column 
2 of tables la and Ib. The information in columns 1 and 2 shows the 
ordered absolute income distributions, which are plotted and shown in 
figure la. Now suppose that in both regions an income of $16 is 
required to purchase the market basket of goods that are deemed to be 
essential for a decent, but minimum, standard of living. The income of 
$16 is the poverty threshold and is represented by the poverty line in 
figure la. Given a poverty line of $16, one individual, A, in region N 
has an absolute income below the poverty threshold and is therefore 
classified as poor, while two persons, F and G, in region S are below 
the poverty line.
The relative incomes of individual persons residing in region N and 
region S are given by their respective proportionate shares of total 
regional income and are shown in column 4 of tables la and Ib. The 
relative shares (proportions) of persons and incomes are cumulated in 
columns 5 and 6. The cumulative shares of persons and incomes can be 
used to construct Lorenz curves, which provide the most basic way of 
representing economic inequality in a society or region. The relative 
income distributions in regions N and S are depicted by the Lorenz 
curves shown in figure Ib, which are obtained by plotting the cumula 
tive shares of persons and incomes in columns 5 and 6. Relative ine 
quality in a region is shown by the deviations of the Lorenz curves
o
away from the 45 degree line in figure Ib, which represents complete 
equality in the distribution of income.
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Table 1. Two Simple Income Distributions—Regions N and S
la. Region N
Shares (proportions)
A
B
C
D
E
Person
(D
12
18
22
28
50
$130
Incomes $a
(2)
.20
.20
.20
.20
.20
1.00
Persons
(3)
.0923
.1385
.1692
.2154
.3846
1.00
Cumulative shares
Income
(4)
.20
.40
.60
.80
1.00
Persons
(5)
.0923
.2308
.4000
.6154
1.0000
Ib. Region S
Shares (proportions)
F
G
H
I
J
Person
(D
10
15
20
25
30
$100
Incomes $a
(2)
.20
.20
.20
.20
.20
1.00
Persons
(3)
.10
.15
.20
.25
.30
1.00
Cumulative shares
Income
(4)
.20
.40
.60
.80
1.00
Persons
(5)
.10
.25
.45
.70
1.00
a. Incomes are ordered from lowest to highest
Figure Ib tells the entire story about income inequality in regions N 
and S, but it deserves emphasis that the relative income distributions 
tell us nothing about regional poverty. The Lorenz curves in figure Ib 
are consistent with the existence of extreme poverty or with the total 
absence of poverty in regions N and S. Similarly, figure la conveys 
much about poverty in regions N and S, but little about income ine 
quality. In summary, if we wish to know about economic inequality, we 
must focus on relative incomes, and the most basic method for doing 
this is to look directly at the Lorenz curves, which show the distribu 
tion of relative incomes. If the goal is to learn about poverty, the task is
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Figure la. Absolute Incomes and the Poverty Line in Two Regions
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somewhat more complex. However, the basic starting point is with the 
absolute income distributions and the poverty line, which are depicted 
in figure la.
Widely Used Measures of Poverty and Inequality
Poverty and inequality can be measured in a variety of different 
ways, but all build upon the absolute and relative income concepts 
described above. It is useful to briefly identify and describe several of 
the most widely used measures that will be utilized in reporting on 
regional poverty and inequality below. The United States is one of the 
few countries that has an official definition of poverty, widely referred 
to as the headcount ratio measure of poverty or, more simply, the pov-
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Figure Ib. Lorenz Curves for Two Regions
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erty rate. You begin with the poverty line and count the number of per 
sons with incomes below the poverty threshold; the headcount ratio 
(poverty rate) is simply the proportion of the population with incomes 
below the poverty line. For example, in our simple income distribu 
tions, for a $16 poverty line, the headcount ratio measure of poverty in 
region N is .2, which means one out of five persons is poor. In region S, 
the poverty rate is .4, which means that 40 percent of the population 
(two out of five) is poor.
Several difficulties with the headcount measure of poverty will be 
discussed below, but for now it is sufficient to note that it is an intu 
itively appealing and easily understood concept that captures an impor 
tant dimension of poverty. However, for the reasons explained in the
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next section, the official headcount measure of poverty fails to incorpo 
rate all relevant aspects of poverty, and it is essential that it be supple 
mented with better measures of income and additional dimensions of 
poverty that encapsulate the missing information.
It is apparent from figure la that the extent of poverty in a region 
depends upon where the poverty line is drawn. If the line is drawn at $8 
rather than $16, there are no poor people in either region! Alternatively, 
if the poverty line is $23, the poverty rate stands at .6 in both regions. 
Thus, two important issues in poverty measurement are: how should 
the poverty line be determined, and exactly where should it be drawn? 
This issue is returned to below, but as a starting point it is helpful to 
explain how the official U.S. poverty line was originally determined, 
and how it is redrawn each year. The poverty threshold levels of 
income were developed in the early 1960s by Mollie Orshansky and 
her colleagues in the Social Security Administration. Using detailed 
consumption expenditure data from the 1950s, it was estimated that, on 
average, U.S. families spent approximately one-third of their cash 
income on food. Orshansky (1965) used these food expenditures to 
estimate what it would cost in 1964 to purchase the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's Economy Food Market Basket, which contained the req 
uisite nutrients for "temporary or emergency use when funds are low." 
These costs were then multiplied by three to obtain the poverty thresh 
old level of income. The expenditure studies revealed that spending on 
food varied with the size of the family and with the age of the family 
head. Families with an elderly head were determined to spend signifi 
cantly less on food than other families, and larger families were found 
to spend more than smaller families. As a consequence, the poverty 
threshold incomes were different depending upon the size of the family 
and whether the head was aged 65 or older. In 1969 the Orshansky 
income thresholds were officially adopted by the federal government 
for purposes of measuring poverty. To change the official poverty line 
across time, the Orshansky thresholds are deflated by using the con 
sumer price index. Table 2 shows the poverty thresholds for 1992 for 
different sized families and for nonelderly heads.
Like poverty, income inequality can be measured in a variety of 
ways. A method that yields unanimous agreement concerning inequal 
ity comparisons is referred to as Lorenz dominance (Atkinson 1970). 
In figure Ib the Lorenz curve of region S is closer to the line of com-
Table 2. U.S. Poverty Thresholds in 1992 by Family Size, Number of Children and Age of Household Head
Poverty Thresholds ($) by Number of Children
Family size
One person
Under 65
65 or over
Two Persons
HH under 65
HH 65 or over
Three persons
Four persons
Five persons
Six persons
Seven persons
Eight persons
Nine+ persons
None
7,299
6,729
9,395
8,480
10,974
14,471
17,451
20,072
23,096
25,831
31,073
One
9,670
9,634
11,293
14,708
17,705
20,152
23,240
26,059
31,223
Two
11,304
14,228
17,163
19,737
22,743
25,590
30,808
Three
14,277
16,743
19,339
21,751
25,179
30,459
Four
16,487
18,747
20,998
24,596
29,887
Five Six Seven Eight+
18,396
20,171
23,855 23,085 22,889
29,099 28,387 28,211 27,124
SOURCE. U S Bureau of the Census (1993) 
NOTE HH denotes household head
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plete equality than the Lorenz curve of region N. S is said to Lorenz 
dominate N, which means that regardless of the specific numerical 
measure (index) used, inequality will always be less in S than in N. A 
corollary to Atkinson's Lorenz dominance theorem is that if the Lorenz 
curves of interest intersect, two summary indices of inequality can 
always be found that yield a conflicting ranking of inequality; one 
index will rank region S as more equal, whereas the second index will 
rank region N as more equal. In our example, Lorenz dominance pre 
vails, and there is no need to worry about the problem of conflicting 
index numbers. Therefore, any number of inequality indices can be 
chosen to represent the level of inequality.
The Gini index is the most widely used and discussed measure of 
inequality, and its intuitive meaning can be easily conveyed using the 
Lorenz curves in figure Ib. The Gini index varies between 0 and 1.0, 
with zero indicating complete equality and 1.0 representing the most 
extreme inequality imaginable (complete inequality). The Gini index is 
larger the more the Lorenz curve bows away from the 45 line, which 
represents a perfectly equal income distribution. Thus, one can look at 
figure Ib and see immediately that region N has a larger Gini index 
than region S because at every point its Lorenz curve is further away 
from the line of equality. The Gini index has a simple geometric inter 
pretation that is related to the line of equality; the Gini is always equal
o
to twice the area between the 45 line (perfect equality) in figure Ib 
and the Lorenz curve of interest. In our example involving regions S 
and N, taking the necessary integrals and doing the calculations reveals 
that GN = 0.276 and Gs = 0.207. Thus, according to the Gini measure 
of inequality, income inequality is one-third greater in region N than 
region S. Like the headcount poverty measure, the Gini index is not a 
perfect measure. For this reason the Lorenz dominance is the primary 
method relied upon in discussing income inequality below. However, 
because it is easy to interpret and widely used, Gini indices of inequal 
ity are also presented. The Gini index is also used when we incorporate 
the distribution of income among the poor into an expanded and 
improved measure of poverty.
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Headcount Measures of Poverty and Dominance 
Measures of Inequality
This section reviews the broad picture of regional poverty and ine 
quality that emerges when one considers the official U.S. poverty sta 
tistics and naively applies the Lorenz dominance technique to gauge 
regional differences in income inequality. The historical relation 
between the absolute and relative income in the South compared to the 
rest of the United States is also briefly discussed. Measurement issues 
and more complex empirical estimates are considered in the sections 
that follow.
Official Poverty Statistics and Comparable Estimates 
for 1939 and 1949
Official poverty statistics are available for each year beginning in 
1959, and Smolensky, Danziger and Gottschalk (1988) have extended 
the series backward by providing comparable estimates for 1939 and 
1949 i The pattern of overall headcount measures of poverty is shown 
in figure 2. Poverty in America fell dramatically in the 1940s, 1950s, 
and 1960s, reaching an historical low point in 1973. Beginning in the 
mid-1970s, the trend in headcount poverty has been mildly upward, 
with cyclical swings and peaks occurring shortly after the trough of 
recessions. The double dip recessions in the early 1980s were particu 
larly severe, and the headcount poverty rate reached 15.2 percent in 
1983, the highest level in the last quarter century.
In 1992 the official poverty rate was 14.5 percent, which was 
approximately the same level as in 1966, when the War on Poverty was 
at its most intense level. However, the U.S. population in 1992 was 255 
million, compared to 196 million in 1966. Therefore, while the head- 
count poverty rate is approximately the same in these two years, there 
were 8.5 million more Americans living in poverty in 1992 than 1966.
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Figure 2. Headcount Poverty Rates Using the Official U.S. Poverty Line 
and Measurement Procedures, 1939-1992
0
39 49 59 73 83 926466
Years
SOURCE- For the official poverty measures for 1959-1992, the data are from U.S. Bureau of 
the Census (1993) The estimates for 1939 and 1949 are from Smolensky, Danziger, and 
Gottschalk(1988).
Table 3 shows the headcount poverty rates among major U.S. 
regions for selected years beginning with 1959, which is the earliest 
date for which official poverty statistics are available. Three implica 
tions are suggested by table 3. First, when viewed in terms of the offi 
cial headcount measures, the South regularly has more poverty than 
other regions. This is most apparent in 1959, but continues to be true 
even in the most recent data. The South's poverty rate was twice the 
level of the rest of the country in 1959, and approximately one-half of 
all persons living in poverty resided in a region that accounted for only 
30 percent of the U.S. population. Second, the official statistics suggest 
that poverty is generally lower in the Northeast than other regions. 
Finally, in each region and the United States as a whole, the incidence 
of poverty among children is approximately 150 percent of the overall 
poverty rate for comparable population. 2
Poverty and Inequality 53
Table 3. Regional Poverty Rates Using the Official Poverty Line and 
Measurement Procedures, 1959-1992
1992
1989
1979
1969
1959
Northeast
12.3 (19.7)
10.0
10.4
8.6
Midwest
12.9 (19.4)
11.9
9.7
9.6
West
14.3(21.3)
12.5
10.0
10.4
16.0a
South
16.3 (24.6)
15.4
15.0
17.9
35.4
U.S.
14.5 (21.7)
12.8
11.7
12 1
22.4
SOURCE: The official poverty statistics for 1992 are from U S Bureau of the Census (1993). For
1959-1979 the statistics are from U S Bureau of the Census (1981). The data for 1989 are from
U S Bureau of the Census (1990)
NOTE Figures in parenthesis denote the poverty rates for children in major regions.
a. Applies to the non-South, i.e., the Northeast, Midwest, and West combined
Income Inequality
Unlike poverty statistics, there are neither official U.S. government 
income distribution statistics nor official measures of economic ine 
quality. However, there are a number of periodic surveys of large sam 
ples of American households that provide information that can be used 
to measure income inequality. A large sample is required to reliably 
gauge regional income inequality, and the two sources most often used 
in the U.S. are the Annual Demographic File of the Current Population 
Survey (March CPS survey) and the economic surveys conducted as a 
part of the decennial Census of Population. 3 We use both sources of 
information in our measures of regional and overall U.S. inequality. 
Income distribution statistics that are consistent across time are avail 
able beginning in the late 1940s. Figures 3a and 3b show Lorenz 
curves from the decennial Census of Population for the family income 
distribution in 1949, 1979, and 1989. Figure 3a shows that the 1979 
Lorenz curve dominates the 1949 curve, which means that income ine 
quality declined over this extended period. Figure 3b depicts the much 
discussed rise in U.S. income inequality in the 1980s and shows that 
1979 Lorenz dominates 1989.4
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Figure 3a. Lorenz Curves for the United States, 1949 and 1979
Line of 
Equality
1949
1979
123456 
Cumulative Proportion of Income Recipients
The substantial rise in income inequality in the nation as a whole in 
the 1980s was accompanied by increases in inequality in each of the 
major regions. The pattern of regional inequality suggested by the fam 
ily income distributions drawn from the decennial Census of Popula 
tion in 1989 is shown in table 4 and figure 4. Pairwise comparisons of 
the Lorenz ordinates in table 4 reveal that in 1989 the Midwest Lorenz 
curve dominates each of the other major regions, while the South is
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Figure 3b. Lorenz Curves for the United States, 1979 and 1989
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Lorenz-dominated by all regions. Note that in columns 2 and 5 of table 
4 the Gini coefficient for the Northeast is slightly smaller than in the 
West, which suggests more equality. However, inspection of the 
Lorenz ordinates reveals that the Lorenz curves in these two regions 
intersect. Under these conditions it is always possible to find at least 
two inequality indices that yield contradictory ranking of regional ine 
quality. This needs to be recognized in interpreting the Gini coeffi 
cients for the Northeast and West. Figure 4 shows Hesse diagrams of 
the inequality orderings of the regions in 1989. The Lorenz ranking of 
the Northeast and West appear on the same level, which means that 
they cannot be ranked using the Lorenz dominance criterion.
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Table 4. Regional and Overall U.S. Income Inequality in 1980
Cumulative 
Proportion 
of 
Families
(1)
.10
.20
.30
.40
.50
.60
.70
.80
.90
1.00
Gini Index
Cumulative Proportion of Incomes
Northeast
(2)
0.013
0.044
0.091
0.151
0.224
0.312
0.413
0.539
0.704
1.000
0.407
Midwest
(3)
0.014
0.048
0.096
0.157
0.233
0.324
0.429
0.552
0.714
1.000
0.392
South
(4)
0.012
0.041
0.085
0.042
0.263
0.301
0.406
0.53
0.695
1.000
0.421
West
(5)
0.014
0.045
0.009
0.149
0.221
0.309
0.411
0.538
0.703
1.000
0.410
U.S.
(6)
0.013
0.044
0.089
0.147
0.22
0.309
0.412
0.535
0.702
1.000
0.411
SOURCE Calculated from summary income distribution data from the 1990 U S Census Popula 
tion Estimates are made using a cubic spline procedure Pareto's Law is used to estimate the mean 
of the open-ended income class
The South's Income Distribution in Historical Perspective
The official poverty statistics and the income distribution statistics 
from the last five Census of Populations indicate two important pieces 
of information concerning regional income distributions. The South 
appears to have lower absolute incomes at the bottom of the income 
distribution, hence greater headcount poverty and more relative income 
inequality than the rest of the country. These results are consistent with 
indirect historical evidence presented by Williamson (1977), which 
strongly suggests that the South had a lower average family income 
and greater income inequality throughout the period 1820 to 1930. 
Thus, the patterns that are observed in reviewing official poverty statis 
tics and Census income distribution data seem to represent a continua 
tion of the historical pattern of the 19th century. However, Wright
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Figure 4. Lorenz and Gini Rankings of Regional Family Income 
Distributions*
4a. Lorenz Dominance
Midwest
Northeast xxxx West
South
4b. Gini Index
Midwest 
G = 0.392
Northeast 
G = 0.407
West 
G = 0.411
South 
G = 0.421
"Estimated from summary income distribution statistics using a cubic spline procedure
(1987) has emphasized that fundamental changes in the 1940s, 1950s, 
and 1960s resulted in the emergence of a national labor market, which 
diminished regional differences in the American labor force. This in 
turn has immense implications for regional income distributions. These 
changes are discussed further below.
Measurement Issues in Evaluating Regional Poverty 
and Income Inequality
There are a number of difficulties in the measurement of income dis 
tributions that affect the reliability of poverty and inequality measures. 
Only the major issues most relevant to evaluating regional poverty and 
inequality in the United States are discussed. In brief, the chief prob 
lems associated with measuring poverty are as follows:
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1. The official poverty statistics are based upon "Census money 
income," which excludes noncash transfers such as food stamps 
and the subsidized component in public housing as well as taxes. 5
2. The official poverty line is essentially arbitrary and could be 
drawn at higher or lower income thresholds. In practice, the only 
change in the official poverty line across time involves inflating 
the Orshansky income thresholds to correct for changes in the 
Consumer Price Index.
3. The Orshansky food expenditure-based income thresholds involve 
a specific equivalent scale for households, and it is now widely 
recognized that there are a large number of such equivalent scales 
that could be used to construct alternative measures of poverty.
4. The official poverty line fails to take into account regional and 
urban-rural variations in the cost of living, which results in an 
overstatement of poverty in regions with low living costs and an 
understatement in high-cost regions.
5. Headcount poverty fails to me.asure the intensity or severity of 
poverty; a person whose income is far below the poverty line is 
treated as if he or she is equivalent to a person who is barely 
below poverty. Similarly, a person who is permanently poor (due, 
say, to a disability that results in zero or low earnings) is treated 
as equivalent to a person who is temporarily down and out, but 
who will soon recover and exit from the poverty group.
6. Given a particular poverty line, the official poverty statistics fail to 
consider the distribution of income among the low-income popu 
lation.
7. The official poverty statistics are based upon the March CPS sur 
vey and are subject to well-known sampling error problems.
There are also measurement issues that are encountered in assessing 
income inequality. Fortunately, they are not nearly so severe as in the 
case of poverty. As noted above, there is no official government mea 
sure of inequality, nor is there anything comparable to a poverty line in 
inequality measurement. Moreover, inequality is a relative income con 
cept, and there is generally no need to make adjustments for regional 
differences in the cost of living. Further, there is wide agreement that
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Lorenz dominance is the most general method of gauging inequality, 
and the measurement procedures are straightforward. Nevertheless, 
there are a number of problems worth noting.
First, a fundamental measurement problem arises when Lorenz 
curves intersect. Under these conditions inequality indices can yield 
contradictory results. An approach that has evolved in the empirical 
study of inequality is to calculate a number of popular inequality indi 
ces to determine whether they in fact conflict. 6 This approach misses 
the point and is really not satisfactory; when Lorenz curves cross per 
fectly, defensible inequality indices can always be uncovered that yield 
conflicting rankings. Fortunately, there has been some recent progress 
on this issue and a better procedure based upon dominance principles 
is now available and can be applied when Lorenz curves intersect. 7
A second problem in assessing inequality is identical to one encoun 
tered in evaluating poverty; income distribution statistics are invariably 
based upon surveys and are subject to sampling error. The wide avail 
ability of micro data that can be used in measuring inequality has led to 
the development of statistical inference procedures that take sampling 
errors into account. These procedures also allow researchers to test sci 
entific hypotheses concerning both regional poverty and inequality. 
Thus, progress has been made on this measurement problem as well. 
However, the availability and wide use of micro data raises additional 
measurement questions that must be addressed if differences and 
changes in regional inequality are to be properly addressed. These 
include the following:
1. When micro data are used, the researcher can define the income- 
receiving unit in several different ways, and it is well known that 
the choice of the recipient unit can influence the resulting mea 
sures of relative inequality. Alternative definitions of the recipient 
include families, households, persons, spending units, and the 
equivalent number of adults in a household, family, or spending 
unit.
2. If the equivalent number of adults is used as the recipient unit, 
which of the many adult equivalence scales should be used? The 
choice of the scale may affect the outcome.
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3. What accounting period should be used in measuring income ine 
quality? Typically one year is used, but this is arbitrary. Most (but 
not all) micro data sets including the widely used March CPS sur 
vey allow for longer periods, and some surveys allow for shorter 
periods. Typically, the researcher has a range of options concern 
ing the time period over which income is measured, and the 
choice can influence measured inequality. 8
Expanded Measures of Regional Poverty and Inequality
This section provides expanded and improved measures of regional 
poverty and income inequality that rely upon micro data and correct 
for some (but not all) of the measurement difficulties outlined above. 
We begin by discussing Amartya Sen's distribution-sensitive index of 
poverty and then report on recent research by Bishop, Formby and 
Zheng (1994) that presents new evidence on regional poverty based 
upon the Census money income used in making official poverty esti 
mates and a more comprehensive income measure that includes the 
effects of direct taxes and noncash transfers. These expanded estimates 
correct for the problem of sampling error and consider the implications 
of alternative poverty lines. The section concludes with a discussion of 
expanded measures of regional income inequality that are provided by 
Bishop, Formby and Thistle (1992, 1994).
Sen Measures of Regional Poverty
Sen (1976) argues persuasively that poverty should be measured and 
evaluated using a three-prong approach that considers the headcount of 
a population living below the poverty line, the income shortfalls of the 
poor, and the inequality of incomes among the poor. According to Sen, 
neither headcount nor income gap measures of poverty, either taken 
together or used alone, are adequate measures of poverty. In Sen's 
view, an acceptable measure of poverty must be distribution-sensitive, 
which means that a transfer of income among the low-income popula 
tion must be reflected in the overall measure of poverty index. In par 
ticular, if income is redistributed from an extremely poor person to a 
higher income person below the poverty line, the measure of poverty
Poverty and Inequality 61
should increase, not decrease. To better understand this point, again 
consider the simple income distribution in regions N and S, shown in 
table 1. If the poverty threshold is $22 then three persons in each 
region are classified as poor according to the headcount measure of 
poverty. Now suppose the government's Antipoverty Agency declares a 
War on Poverty and uses its powers to redistribute $3 from the poorest 
person in each region, A and F, to the least poor person, C and H. The 
transfers raise the incomes of C and H so that these individuals are 
moved above the poverty line. Thus, headcount poverty falls in both 
regions and the poverty fighting agency can claim success. However, 
the redistribution from an intensely poor person to a less poor person 
always increases relative inequality among the poor. One of Sen's great 
accomplishments demonstrates that when the headcount ratio and aver 
age income shortfall (poverty gap) of the poor are both constant, a rise 
in income inequality among the poor necessarily increases the eco 
nomic deprivation among the poor. This is the case irrespective of 
whether the rise in income inequality among the poor is caused by 
market forces or a change in government policies.
To avoid these difficulties Sen proposes a poverty index that is 
simultaneously sensitive to headcount poverty, the income shortfall of 
the poor (poverty gap), and the distribution of income among the poor. 
His index is said to be a "distribution-sensitive measure of poverty" 
and is now widely referred to simply as the Sen index. To incorporate 
all relevant dimensions of poverty, Sen proposes an index that is equal 
to the aggregated income gaps between each poor person's income and 
the poverty line, weighted by each individual's relative rank among the 
poor. Sen shows that such an index, which is denoted as S, can be writ 
ten as:
S-.
where H is the headcount poverty ratio, 7 is the ratio of the average 
income shortfall-to-poverty line (hereinafter referred to as the poverty 
gap ratio), Gp is the Gini coefficient of income inequality among the 
poor, and q is the number of people below the poverty threshold.
Bishop, Formby and Zheng (1994) use the Sen index and its compo 
nents—the headcount poverty ratio (//), the poverty gap ratio (/), and 
the Gini coefficient of income inequality among the poor (Gp)—to pro-
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vide expanded measures of regional poverty in the United States in 
1979, 1985, and 1990. They devise new statistical inference proce 
dures, consider two distinct income measures, and report their results 
for three different poverty lines. They analyze the official poverty line 
and make use of Census money income, so one set of their estimates is 
directly comparable to the official poverty measures. They also con 
sider poverty lines 25 percent above and 25 percent below the official 
(Orshansky) thresholds and present evidence for a comprehensive 
income measure as well as the more restrictive concept used in the offi 
cial poverty statistics. The different income measures have consider 
able impact upon regional poverty, and it is helpful to briefly elaborate 
on how income is measured. The differences between Census money 
income and the comprehensive income concept measure that Bishop, 
Formby and Zheng (1994) use are revealed by the following defini 
tions:
Census 
Money =
Income
Wages and Salaries
+
Self-Employment Income
+
Dividends, Rents and Interest
+
Cash Transfers (e.g., AFDC)
and
Comprehensive 
Income
Census 
Money + 
Income
Market Value 
of Food Stamps
Market Value 
of Housing Subsidies
Market Value 
of Energy Subsidies
Market Value 
of SchoolLunch Program
Market Value 
of WIC Program
Federal Income 
Taxes
State Income 
Taxes
Payroll Taxes
Earned Income 
Tax Credit
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Table 5 summarizes the regional Sen poverty indices for 1979, 1985, 
and 1990 that are estimated using the official poverty line. The changes 
in poverty across time that Bishop, Formby and Zheng (1994) find to 
be statistically significant from zero are indicated by asterisks. Tables 6 
and 7 show comparable information when estimates are made using 
poverty lines that are respectively 25 percent below and 25 percent 
above the official poverty thresholds. Inspection of tables 5, 6, and 7 
reveals that the major impact of moving the poverty line up or down is 
to increase or decrease measured poverty in each of the regions. In one 
instance (the West, comprehensive income, 1979-1985) changing the 
poverty line influences the finding concerning whether a rise in poverty 
is statistically significant. However, for the most part, drawing the pov 
erty line at a higher or lower income threshold has little impact on the 
statistical findings concerning changes in regional poverty across time.
To address the question of which U.S. region has the least poverty 
and which region has the most we summarize Bishop, Formby and 
Zheng's statistical rankings of Sen indices using the Hesse diagrams in 
figure 5. Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c show the orderings of regional poverty 
in 1979, 1985, and 1990 in terms of the Census money income, while 
figures 5d, 5e and 5f show the regional orderings for the same years in 
terms of comprehensive income. In each Hesse diagram, regions with 
the lowest level of poverty are at the top of the diagram, regions that 
have Sen indices that are not significantly different are ranked on the 
same level, and regions ranked at the bottom have the most severe pov 
erty. Figure 5 clearly illustrates the advantages of an inference-based 
analysis of poverty; five of the six Hesse diagrams show examples of 
regions that are not significantly different from one another, a finding 
that is virtually impossible using simple comparisons of point esti 
mates.
Now consider the regional rankings in terms of Census money 
income shown in figures 5a, 5b, and 5c. The statistical rankings sug 
gest two general conclusions. The Midwest and West are at the top dia 
gram, indicating that they have significantly less poverty when 
evaluated in terms of Sen's distribution-sensitive measure. Conversely, 
the South and Northeast are almost always at the bottom, which means 
these regions have significantly more poverty than the West and Mid 
west when Census money is the metric. A quite different pattern 
emerges when the comprehensive income measure is used. The Mid-
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Table 5. Sen Indices of Regional Poverty Estimated Using the Official 
Poverty Line, 1979,1985, and 1990
5a. Census Money Income
Time period
1979
1985
1990
Percent change 
1979-1985
Percent change 
1985-1990
Northeast
0.044
0.081
0.083
85.2**
2.2
Midwest
0.035
0.061
0.064
115.9**
3.8
South
0.059
0.073
0.086
25.5**
17.2**
West
0.038
0.056
0.071
25.9**
25.9**
5b. Comprehensive Income
Time period
1979
1985
1990
Percent change 
1970-1985
Percent change 
1985-1990
Northeast
0.022
0.025
0.069
15.5
172.3**
Midwest
0.020
0.027
0.048
32.8**
80.1**
South
0.025
0.038
0.067
48.6**
81.2**
West
0.027
0.032
0.061
17.5**
88.2**
**Sigmficant at the 1 percent level.
west continues to be ranked at the top; in each of the years considered, 
the Midwest's Sen index is lower or as low as any other region. How 
ever, in the other regions there are significant changes in Sen index 
rankings. This is most dramatic for the Northeast. In 1979 and 1985, 
poverty measured in terms of comprehensive income in the Northeast 
was no different from the Midwest and was significantly less than in 
the West and South. But in 1990, the Northeast's Sen index was signif 
icantly larger than those of the West and Midwest and had increased to 
a level such that it was not significantly different from the Sen index in 
the South.
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Table 6. Sen Indices of Regional Poverty Estimated Using a Poverty Line 
25 Percent Below the Official Threshold, 1979,1985, and 1990
6a. Census Money Income
Time period Northeast Midwest South
6b. Comprehensive Income
West
1979
1985
1990
0.024
0.051
0.054
0.020
0.040
0.041
0.034
0.050
0.057
0.024
0.035
0.043
Percent change 
1979-1985
Percent change 
1985-1990
111.6**
5.9
100.0**
2.5
44.2**
14.5**
48.1**
22.6**
Time period
1979
1985
1990
Percent change 
1970-1985
Percent change 
1985-1990
Northeast
0.013
0.015
0.039
14.4
159.6**
Midwest
0.013
0.017
0.026
30.7**
56.6**
South
0.034
0.050
0.057
59.7**
66.1**
West
0.018
0.020
0.035
8.2
116.8**
**Sigmficant at the 1 percent level.
The entire pattern of Sen measures of regional poverty among 
regions and across time suggests the following conclusions. The Mid 
west is at the top of the rankings in all but one case (Census money 
income, 1985), where it is ranked in the second position. The South is 
generally ranked toward the bottom of the Hesse diagrams, indicating 
that it usually has significantly greater poverty than other regions for 
both measures of income. In contrast, the ranking of the Northeast and 
West are sensitive to the income definition and the time period. For 
example, in 1979, the West is ranked at the top of the Census income 
diagram (lowest poverty) but at the bottom of the comprehensive
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Table 7. Sen Indices of Regional Poverty Estimated Using a Poverty Line 
25 Percent Above the Official Threshold, 1979,1985, and 1990
7a. Census Money Income
Time period
1979
1985
1990
Percent change 
1979-1985
Percent change 
1985-1990
Northeast
0.067
0.114
0.112
70.0**
-1.7
Midwest
0.054
0.084
0.087
564**
3.9
South
0.086
0.100
0.118
16.3**
17.9**
West
0.055
0.080
0101
47.0**
26.1*
7b. Comprehensive Income
Time period
1979
1985
1990
Percent change 
1970-1985
Percent change 
1985-1990
Northeast
0.034
0.040
0.101
16.3
153.3**
Midwest
0.031
0.041
0.074
32.0**
80.1**
South
0.040.
0.055
01002
36.8**
83.5**
West
0.040
0048
0.092
20.8
90.9**
*Sigmficant at the 5 percent level
**Sigmficant at the 1 percent level
income diagram (highest poverty). The most striking differences, which 
reflect fundamental changes, occurred in the Northeast. For example, in 
1985 the Northeast was at the top of the comprehensive income ranking 
and at the bottom of the Census money income ranking. There is also 
great variability in Northeastern poverty across time—between 1985 
and 1990 the Northeast falls from the top to the bottom of the regional 
ranking in terms of comprehensive income. Over the entire decade, the 
Northeast changed from having quite low poverty compared to other 
regions, to having significantly greater poverty than the West and Mid 
west and the same poverty as the South. If reliable methods for correct-
Figure 5. Hesse Diagrams for Statistical Rankings of Sen Indices of Poverty by Region and Income Measures, 1979, 
1985, and 1990*
5a. Census Money Income, 1979 5b. Census Money Income, 1985 5c. Census Money Income, 1990
5d. Comprehensive Income, 1979 5e. Comprehensive Income, 1985 5f. Comprehensive Income, 1990
*The higher a region is in the ranking, the lower the Sen index of poverty. Two regions on the same level indicate that the null hypothesis of no difference 
in Sen indices cannot be rejected.
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ing absolute incomes for differences in regional costs of living were 
available, then the problem of poverty in the Northeast would, in all 
likelihood, be revealed to be even more severe. 9
Regional Income Inequality
Advances in the measurement of regional income inequality have 
been made possible by the development of statistical inference proce 
dures for Lorenz dominance. The original test procedure was proposed 
by Beach and Davidson (1983), with important improvements and 
extensions by Beach and Kalisky (1986) and Bishop, Formby, and 
Thistle (1989). The new methods have been applied to large samples 
drawn from the public use computer files of the Census of Population 
and used by Bishop, Formby and Thistle (1992, 1994) to measure U.S. 
regional income inequality. As noted above, the use of micro data 
allows the income receiving unit to be defined in alternative ways and 
the results reported below are for three widely used definitions: the 
household, which is the basic sampling unit in income surveys; per 
capita household; and "needs-adjusted" equivalent persons per house 
hold, with the latter based upon the equivalence scale implicit in the 
Orshansky poverty thresholds. 10 Bishop, Formby and Thistle present 
results for the South and non-South (1992) and for major regions 
(1994) in 1969 and 1979. Figure 6 summarizes their findings in a 
Hesse diagram that shows the statistical rankings. Figure 6a indicates 
that in 1969 there were no statistically significant differences among 
the Lorenz curves of the major regions comprising the non-South, and 
all three non-South regions Lorenz dominated the South. Thus, 
regional differences in inequality in 1969 represented a continuation of 
the historical pattern that prevailed throughout much of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. In the 1970s, fundamental changes occurred in 
the regional income distributions of the United States that resulted in 
convergence of the South's Lorenz curve to the rest of the country." 
Using a confidence level of 99 percent, Bishop, Formby and Thistle 
(1992) show that the null hypothesis of no difference between the 
Lorenz curves of the South and non-South 12 cannot be rejected for any 
of the definitions of the income-receiving unit. 13 The convergence of 
the South's Lorenz curve to the Lorenz curve of the rest of the country
Figure 6. Hesse Diagrams for Statistical Rankings of Regional Lorenz Curves for Three Definitions of the Income 
Receiving Unit
Figure 6a. 1969 Figure 6b. 1979
South versus Non-South South versus Non-South
Non-South
South
Non-South South
Northeast
Major Regions
Midwest
South
West
Major Regions
Statistical comparisons 
yield mixed results 
depending upon the 
definition of the income 
receiving unit
*The three definitions of the recipient unit are the household, per capita household, and "needs adjusted" equivalent number of persons per household, 
where the equivalence scale implicit in the Orshansky poverty thresholds are used to determine needs
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is indicated by the equivalence of the South and non-South at the top of 
figure 6b.
In a second study, Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1994) decompose 
the non-South into the component subregions and show that while the 
South was converging to the non-South, which is an aggregation of the 
Northeast, Midwest and West, the regions of the non-South were 
diverging from one another. The Lorenz curves of the major regions in 
1979 are sensitive to the definition of the income-receiving unit and are 
not easily described with a Hesse diagram. Nevertheless, several inter 
esting results reported by Bishop, Formby and Thistle (1994) are worth 
noting. First, for household Lorenz curves, there are statistically signif 
icant differences between component regions of the non-South in 
1979. There are also no differences in inequality between the South, 
Midwest and West. However, the Midwest Lorenz dominates the 
South. Second, for per capita incomes, the Northeast and West Lorenz 
curves appear to have been equivalent. But the Midwest dominates the 
Northeast and South and is dominated by the West. For the needs- 
adjusted Lorenz curves, the pattern of regional inequality in 1979 is 
even more complex. Pairwise Lorenz comparisons of the West and 
South, Midwest and Northeast and Midwest, and West and Northeast 
suggest equivalent needs-adjusted relative inequality. However, the 
inference tests indicate that in 1979, the needs-adjusted Lorenz curve 
of the West dominated the Midwest, while the South was dominated by 
both Midwest and Northeast.
The changes in regional income inequality in the 1970s were dra 
matic and lead to the natural question of what factors account for the 
observed patterns. Economists have been expecting and predicting the 
convergence of the South and non-South for a long time, but the 
diverging income distributions in the regions of the non-South are 
more difficult to explain. The integration of labor and capital markets 
and the free flow of resources between the North and the South tends to 
lead to equalization of factor prices and income in the long run. Thus, 
it is scarcely surprising that the South finally converged or almost con 
verged to the rest of the United States. It is more difficult to explain 
why the income distributions of the Northeast, Midwest, and West 
diverged in the 1970s. Bishop, Formby and Thistle (1994) offer a tenta 
tive explanation of this surprising development. They suggest that the 
1970s was a period of disequilibrium in terms of regional income dis-
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tributions that reflected a more open U.S. economy and international 
trade, rising relative prices of energy, rapid technological change, and 
massive flows of highly educated and skilled workers out of the North 
east and, to a certain extent the Midwest, to the South and West. If this 
explanation is correct, it is reasonable to expect the regions of the non- 
South to eventually converge so that they are again statistically equiva 
lent when evaluated in terms of Lorenz dominance.
Regional inequality in the 1980s and 1990s has not been studied 
with the same intensity as the 1960s and 1970s, and Bishop, Formby 
and Thistle's work has not been replicated for the more recent period. 
However, Bishop, Formby and Smith (1992) have applied the same 
inference-based Lorenz dominance methodology to annual CPS survey 
data and documented a massive rise in overall U.S. income inequality 
during the period 1978 to 1983. Relative inequality continued to rise in 
the United States as a whole into the late 1980s, but recently the rise 
seems to have abated. When regional inequality during this period is 
studied, it will be surprising if the unprecedented increases in the late 
1970s and 1980s did not also involve significant regional changes in 
inequality.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Since the early work of Watts (1968), it has been recognized that 
poverty is a multidimensional concept, and that the social and eco 
nomic problems associated with it do not disappear when one crosses a 
particular income line. Nevertheless, economic definitions and mea 
surement are essential if we are to understand poverty and be in a posi 
tion to evaluate policy proposals that influence the well-being of a 
large segment of our population. The work of philosopher John Rawls 
(1971) would have us evaluate the well-being of an entire society by 
focusing on the poorest individual. Many people are probably unwill 
ing to accept Rawls' stringent criterion; a proposition that would likely 
garner more widespread support among most Americans is that when 
poverty significantly increases, there can be no claim of an overall 
improvement in the economy even if the average income rises or the 
middle class benefits. Further, many would accept the proposition that
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substantial and rising disparities in poverty across regions and among 
other population subgroups is another relevant dimension along which 
the overall well-being of a society can be judged.
If the last two propositions are accepted as axioms for use in evalu 
ating policy proposals, then they have immediate implications for wel 
fare reform, middle class tax cuts, and the proposal to end unfunded 
federal mandates to state governments that is being widely discussed in 
Washington at the present time. Many Americans perceive that the sys 
tem of public welfare jointly administered by states and the federal 
government is in need of reform, and over the last several years a new 
political coalition has emerged and it now seems possible that substan 
tial changes will be enacted. Both major political parties have legisla 
tive plans to reduce transfers to the poor and use the proceeds to fund a 
revenue neutral tax to what is variously described as the "middle 
class." Further, the President is committed to "ending welfare as we 
know it" and to a middle class tax cut. In addition, there is a major 
push that has strong bipartisan support to end unfunded federal man 
dates to state governments. Thus, the mid 1990s seem to be a period in 
which Director's Law of Income Redistribution is likely to apply with 
a vengeance. Director's Law (Stigler 1970) holds that political compe 
tition for the support of the middle class will lead democratic govern 
ments to redistribute income to families in the middle of the income 
distribution. In principle, the Law is symmetrical with respect to per 
sons in the upper and lower tails of the distribution, but today those 
who appear most likely to lose from the operation of Director's Law 
are welfare recipients at the bottom of the income distribution.
Regardless of the intent of the proposed policy shifts and irrespec 
tive of the long-run effects of such changes on welfare dependency, 
there are short-run impact effects of the policies currently being dis 
cussed that are not well understood and which have important implica 
tions for economic well-being. When Sen proposed his poverty index 
in 1976, he observed that measures of poverty that emphasized only 
the poverty line and the headcount ratio provided policy makers with 
the option of playing games; they can implement policies that they can 
claim make things better, while in fact they are making them worse. 
Suppose the policy makers are interested in headlines and 30-second 
sound bites and are in fact seeking to get reelected by implementing
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Director's Law. What are they likely to do? It seems that they will do 
pretty much what Sen anticipated.
I want to conclude with the description of a simple simulation to 
investigate the redistributive effects of welfare reform. In 1994 I began 
working on the relationship of the food stamp program to poverty and 
have a very nice data set on comprehensive incomes and food stamps. 
In order to gauge the effects of reforming the food stamp program, I 
simulated the effects of cutting this aspect of the welfare program. 
Revenue saved by cutting food stamps was statistically redistributed in 
a revenue-neutral manner by lowering middle class tax rates. Cuts of 
25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 percent were simulated, 
which generated quite a lot of revenue to finance redistributions to the 
middle class. What impact would cuts of this magnitude have on pov 
erty? If only the official poverty statistics are considered, the answer is 
nothing; food stamps are not counted as a part of Census money 
income. On the other hand, if the official poverty line and measurement 
methodology are applied to comprehensive income, the simulations 
suggest that headcount poverty increases only slightly, but the poverty 
gap, the Gini index among the poor and the Sen index all rise substan 
tially more. The simulations suggest the following effects of com 
pletely eliminating the food stamp program:
Census Money Income
Official Poverty Statistics No Change
Comprehensive Income
Headcount Poverty Rate + 7.9% 
Poverty (Income) Gap Ratio +13.3% 
Gini Index of the Poor +13.5% 
Sen Index of Poverty +20.2%
These simulations strongly suggest that, if enacted, the current pol 
icy proposals will seriously aggravate the problem of poverty in Amer 
ica. If the axioms advanced above are accepted, then the short-run 
impacts of welfare reform policies will be to lower the overall eco 
nomic well-being of the country.
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I now conclude by pointing out that I have not simulated the effects 
of welfare reform on regional poverty or on other population sub 
groups, but the short-run impacts are predictable. Overall, poverty will 
rise and poverty among vulnerable groups such as children is likely to 
rise substantially more than the average. Reforming the food stamp and 
the AFDC program are likely to have a quite different regional impact 
on poverty. The reason for this is that the size of AFDC payments var 
ies widely from state to state; the maximum payments are generally 
much smaller in the South than in the non-South. For example, in 
1991, Alabama's maximum AFDC payment for a family of three was 
$124, whereas Michigan's maximum was $555. Clearly, federal cuts in 
AFDC would be much more severe in the non-South. In contrast, food 
stamps are allocated on the basis of Census money income, and there is 
much less regional variation. But even in the case of food stamp 
reform, I expect that there will be significant differences in the regional 
impacts of welfare reform.
NOTES
1 Smolensky, Danziger and Gottschalk (1988) apply the Orshansky measurement procedures 
to samples drawn from the 1940 and 1950 decennial Census of Population, which contains 
income data for 1939 and 1949 The measurement procedures cannot be replicated exactly, but 
their estimates indicate that 68 1 percent of Americans were poor in 1939, and 39 7 percent were 
in poverty in 1949
2 The incidence of poverty among children has been rising more rapidly than in the general 
population On this point see Smolensky, Danziger and Gottschalk (1988)
3 Other data sources could be used but they involve either much smaller samples or they are 
not truly representative of the regional populations of interest
4 The Lorenz curve for 1949 in figure 3a crosses the Lorenz curve for 1989 in figure 3b
5 Census money income includes wages and salaries + self-employment income + dividends, 
rents, and interest + cash transfers.
6 See, for example, Braun (1988)
7 See Davies and Hoy (1994) and Formby and Zheng (1994) for discussions of this issue and 
the improved procedures.
8. Surveys containing more than one observation of income in two or more time periods are 
said to contain "panel data," which means the researcher can use alternative accounting periods 
for measuring income, poverty, and inequality The March CPS survey contains observations for 
two consecutive years for approximately one-half the households surveyed each year. The Survey 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) contains thirty monthly observations, which means 
the accounting period can vary from one month up to 2 5 years The Consumer Expenditure Sur 
vey contains quarterly data for five quarters. The longest panels that are broadly representative of 
the entire population are Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Internal Revenue Ser 
vice's continuous Work History File, which contain annual income observations for extended time 
periods
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9 Variations in the regional cost of living are widely recognized to be a problem when poverty 
is measured using absolute incomes See, for example, the General Accounting Office's Federal 
Aid. Revising Poverty Statistics Affects Fairness of Allocation Formulas (1994) Unfortunately, 
there are no consistent and reliable measures of differences in regional cost of living across time 
A number of researchers including Tremblay (1986) and Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1992, 
1994) have used the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Three Budgets for an Urban Family of Four Per 
sons (U.S Department of Labor 1979) to construct valid regional cost of living indices for the 
1960s and 1970s. Unfortunately, a key statistical series required to estimate regional costs of liv 
ing using this methodology was discontinued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in response to 
Reagan administration budget cuts in the early 1980s.
10 Cowell (1984) reviews alternative definitions of the income-receiving unit and suggests 
criteria for limiting the number considered The three definitions considered correspond to the 
approaches he most strongly recommends It is worth pointing out that all adjustment of the micro 
data to obtain alternative recipient units are completed prior to grouping the data into deciles and 
conducting statistical tests. For example, a four-person household with total income of $30,000 is 
included in the per capita household income-receiving unit as four separate incomes of $7,500 
each For a four-person household, the Orshansky needs index is 1 95 and four needs-adjusted 
incomes of $15,384 62 are included in the needs-adjusted equivalent person income distribution
11 There is a growing literature on regional convergence that focuses on absolute incomes. 
See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992), who focus on regional growth and the 
convergence of per capita mean incomes Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1992, 1994) analyze con 
vergence of entire income distributions and consider both absolute and relative incomes
12 Micro data allow the regions to be defined by a combination of states. To enhance the com 
parability of their results, Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1992) use the Census definitions of the 
South, which includes AL, AR, DE, FL,GA,KY, LA, MD, MS,NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV, 
and Washington, DC. The remaining contiguous states make up the non-South
13 This result is sensitive to the confidence level of the test If a 5 percent test is used, conver 
gence is complete for the per capita and needs-adjusted Lorenz curves However, the Lorenz curve 
of household income, the south had not quite converged in the bottom decile On this point, see 
Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1992)
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The International Evidence 
on Income Distribution 
in Modern Economics
Where Do We Stand?
Timothy M. Smeeding
Syracuse University
and
Luxembourg Income Study
Interest in cross-national comparison of personal income distribu 
tions, low relative incomes, and income inequality in general has 
grown dramatically during the past several years. Interest in cross- 
national distribution research did not come about by accident; several 
factors helped propel this line of research in the 1980s and 1990s. First 
of all, income distributions in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and in several other nations began to trend toward greater inequality. 
Second, the former socialist nations of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) began a still-continuing process of economic and social adjust 
ment and transition to a new socioeconomic order. While this transition 
is still underway, CEE nations have experienced large changes in both 
real income levels and in income distribution. Third, along with the 
rise in inequality, a growing interest in the question of "fairness pres 
sures" was present in the national political debates of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, thus making "income distribution" a legitimate realm 
of political inquiry. 1 Finally, the emergence of comparable cross- 
national data on distribution allowed for comparisons of similarities 
and differences across countries and over time. Similarities and differ 
ences in experiences may help us understand how market forces, 
demographic trends, and public policy affect the relative economic sta 
tus of various groups in each nation.
This chapter summarizes and provides limited updates on a small 
part of what was learned in a large study undertaken for the OECD 
(Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995a), and a subsequent review 
article (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1996). It also adds recent material
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for CEE nations (Torrey, Smeeding, and Bailey 1996) and for Taiwan 
(Republic of China).
The chapter starts from a position of caution as to what can be 
achieved by a summary of the empirical evidence. Due to space con 
straints, we are unable to enumerate all of the limitations of the data. 
However, we should note that the quality of the CEE datasets is ques 
tionable, since we have not been able to verify their data by comparing 
them with administrative records. On the other hand, the data for 
OECD nations is generally high quality. All of these data were gener 
ated by the Luxembourg Income Study, and those interested in this 
dataset should consult Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995a, 
chapters 2, 3, and appendices).
Of course, the quality of the data is not the only reason for exercis 
ing caution in drawing conclusions regarding recent trends in inequal 
ity. The problem of choosing a measure of inequality is also 
troublesome, as is the even more basic problem of measuring income. 
The section that follows contains an introduction to those measures of 
inequality most commonly taken, as well as definitions of income. 
Throughout this paper we concentrate our attention on inequality in 
only two measures of income: market income and disposable income. 2
The degree of income inequality in the 1980s and early 1990s is 
then compared among twenty-five countries. These are the eighteen 
OECD nations, five eastern European nations, and Israel and Taiwan. 
One question to be asked is whether one can identify distinct groupings 
of countries with different degrees of inequality? A brief discussion of 
the trend in inequality in recent years follows, asking if there is a 
worldwide trend toward greater inequality or whether groups of coun 
tries have had similar experiences. Some of the factors that seem to 
have affected inequality are addressed, including differences in market 
incomes, demographic factors, and government intervention (direct 
taxes and transfers). The final section summarizes the chapter and 
offers suggestions for additional research.
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Choices and Measures
There are currently no international standards for income distribu 
tion that parallel the international standards used for systems of 
national income accounts. 3 Hence, researchers need to decide what 
they want to measure and how far they can measure it on a comparable 
basis. The Luxembourg Income Study offers the researcher many 
choices of perspective in terms of country, income measure, account 
ing unit, and time frame, but its relatively short time frame (1979-1993 
for most nations, but 1968-1995 for five countries) and limited number 
of observation periods per country (three to five periods per country at 
present) currently limits its usefulness for studying longer term trends 
in income distribution. The purpose of this section of the paper is to 
explain the choices we have made in our use of the Luxembourg 
Income Study.
Choices: Inequality of What among Whom on What Terms?
Our attention is focussed primarily on the distribution of disposable 
money income, that is income after direct taxes plus transfer payments. 
Several points should be noted:
1. Income rather than consumption is taken as the indicator of 
resources, although there may be both theoretical and empirical 
arguments favoring use of the latter.
2. The definition of income falls considerable short of the Haig- 
Simons comprehensive definition, typically excluding much of 
capital gains, imputed rents, home production, and most of 
income in-kind (with the exception of near-cash benefits).
3. No account is taken of indirect taxes or of the benefits from pub 
lic spending (other than cash and near-cash transfers) such as 
health care, education, or most housing subsidies.
4. The period of income measurement is in general the calendar 
year, with income measured on an annual basis (although the 
United Kingdom evidence relates to weekly or monthly income).
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Thus, variables measured may be less than ideal, and results may not 
be fully comparable across countries. For example, one country may 
help low-income families through money benefits (included in cash 
income), whereas another provides subsidized housing, child care, or 
education (which are not taken into account). While, a recent study 
(Smeeding et al. 1993) finds that the distribution of housing, education, 
and health care benefits reinforces the general differences in income 
distribution for a subset of the western nations examined here, there is 
no guarantee that these relationships hold for other countries or meth 
ods of accounting.4 Still this study shows that countries that spend 
more for cash benefits tend also to spend more for noncash benefits. 
Because noncash benefits are more equally distributed than are cash 
benefits, levels of inequality within countries are lessened, but the 
same rank ordering of these countries with respect to inequality levels 
found here using cash alone persists when noncash benefits are added 
in.
Market income, which includes earned income from wages and sala 
ries and self-employment, cash property income (but not capital gains 
or losses), and other private cash income transfers (occupational pen 
sions, alimony, and child support) is the primary source of disposable 
income for most nonelderly families. To obtain disposable income, we 
first add public transfer payments (social retirement, family allow 
ances, unemployment compensation, welfare benefits) and deduct per 
sonal income tax and social security contributions from market 
income. Then near-cash benefits—those that are virtually equivalent to 
cash (food stamps in the United States and housing allowances in the 
United Kingdom and Sweden)—are added in. 5 Thus, differences 
between disposable and market income capture the net effects of 
income redistribution.
The question of the distribution "amongst whom" is here given the 
simplest answer: amongst individuals. When assessing disposable 
income inequality, however, the unit of aggregation is the household: 
the incomes of all household members are aggregated and then divided 
by an equivalence scale to arrive at individual equivalent income. The 
choice of the household, rather than a narrower unit such as the spend 
ing unit or the family, is open to debate. It captures the economies of 
scale extant in shared living arrangements, but it assumes a degree of 
income-sharing within the household that may not be realized. 6
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Data Base
The aim of the Luxembourg Income Study data used here is to 
increase the degree of cross-national comparability, but complete 
cross-national comparability is not possible, even if we were to admin 
ister our own surveys in each nation. Comparability is a matter of 
degree, and all that one can hope for is to reach an acceptably high 
level. It is left to the reader to decide if the level of comparability found 
in this study is acceptable. Many of the cross-national results provided 
here have been reviewed by a team of national experts—statisticians, 
social scientists, and policy analysts—prior to their publication by 
OECD and in other forums. This painstaking two-year process helped 
improve the quality of the analysis while also testing the mettle of both 
the analysts and the reviewers. In some nations, we only update OECD 
results to a later year using the same national database. Finally, our 
results for CEE nations have been reviewed by teams of country 
experts, but not by national authorities.
Income Inequality in Twenty-Five Nations
The Luxembourg Income Study data sets have been used here to 
compare the distribution of disposable income in twenty-five nations 
over a five- to ten-year period. 7 The numbers presented are taken from 
the most recent LIS data and correspond generally to the results found 
in Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995a), which use earlier 
years' LIS data in most cases. Table 1 gives the incomes of high- and 
low-income persons as percentages of median income. High income 
(P90) is defined as the income of a person in the 90th percentile of the 
income distribution while low income is that of a person in the 10th 
percentile. 8 The ratio of high-to-low incomes (decile ratio) is also 
shown. For instance, the high-to-low ratio in Russia is 6.83, indicating 
that a person with an income at the 90th percentile enjoys almost seven 
times the income of a person at the 10th percentile. This is the highest 
decile ratio in our sample, followed by the United States (5.67) and 
Australia (4.26).
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Table 1. The Gap between Low- and High-Income Individuals 
(numbers given are percent in each nation)
Country
Slovak Republic 1992
Czech Republic 1992
Finland 1991
Belgium 1992
Sweden 1992
Norway 1991
Denmark 1992
Netherlands 1991
Germany 1984
Luxembourg 1985
Italy 1991
Austria 1987
Switzerland 1982
Hungary 1991
New Zealand 1987/88
France 1984
Poland 1992
United Kingdom 1986
Canada 1991
Repubbc of China/Taiwan 1991
Spain 1990
Ireland 1987
Australia 1989
United States 1991
Russia 1992
Averaged
Low3
66
65
58
59
58
57
55
59
57
59
56
56
54
53
54
55
51
51
47
50
49
50
45
37
35
53
Highb
149
155
158
163
159
158
155
172
170
184
176
187
185
180
187
193
192
194
183
195
198
209
193
207
239
182
Ratio of high 
tolow0
2.25
2.36
274
2.76
2.77
2.79
2.84
2.94
2.98
3.12
3.14
3.34
3.43
3.46
3.46
3.51
3.76
3.80
3.86
3.90
4.04
4.18
4.26
5.67
6.83
3.53
SOURCE Author's tabulation of data in the Luxembourg Income Study
a Relative income for individuals who are lower than 90 percent of the individuals in the country 
and higher than 10 percent of the individuals as a percent of national median, 
b. Relative income for individuals who are higher than 90 percent of the individuals in the coun 
try and lower than 10 percent of the individuals as a percent of national median 
c Ratio of 90th to 10th percentiles, or decile ratio 
d. Simple 25-nation average
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Looking at the low column in table 1, we see that the three countries 
with the highest decile ratio are characterized by low P10 values. In 
Russia, the United States, and Australia, the relative incomes of per 
sons in the 10th percentile are 35, 37, and 45 respectively. These are 
the lowest values in our sample, and contrast with values ranging from 
52 to 60 for countries with a below-average decile ratio. However, 
countries with above-average decile ratios also tend to have high 
incomes substantially greater than average. In fact, though Russia, the 
United States, and Australia are distinguished by high incomes well 
above the average for the sample, other high-decile ratio countries— 
such as Ireland, Spain, and Taiwan—have very respectable low-income 
levels (50,49, 50).
While percentile ratios have some obvious appeal (e.g., insensitivity 
to top coding, ease of understanding), they have the disadvantage of 
focusing on only a few points in the distribution and lack a normative 
basis. Table 2 presents an alternative Lorenz-based summary measure 
of inequality, the Gini coefficient, with countries grouped according to 
type (OECD, CEE, Taiwan, Israel). 9
Among the OECD nations, the lowest Gini is found in Finland, fol 
lowed by most but not all of the Scandinavian nations. Austria's coeffi 
cients must be treated with caution because of their exclusion of self- 
employment income, but they and those of the smallest Benelux 
nations come next, followed by West Germany, Italy, and the Nether 
lands. There is then a gap of 0.15 points to Canada and France. The 
United Kingdom, Spain, and Australia are next, with another gap of 
0.14 to Switzerland, Ireland, and finally the United States. As mea 
sured by these Ginis, the range of inequality across OECD nations runs 
from 0.223 (Finland) to 0.343 (United States), or by as much as 54 per 
cent.
Turning to the CEE nations, income inequality in the Czech and Slo 
vak Republics is most similar to that found in the Scandinavian econo 
mies, while Hungary and Poland are similar to France, Canada, 
Australia, and the United Kingdom. Russia had the highest Gini as 
well as the highest rich-to-poor ratio of all countries for which we have 
LIS data in the 1990s. This is partially the result of some very high 
incomes, since the Gini changes by a large fraction when we impose a 
top code of 10 times the median adjusted income in Russia, while other 
nations' estimates change little, if at all. But even when income is top-
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Table 2. Measures of Inequality in OECD Countries, in Transition 
Economies, and in Taiwan and Israel
Country
Finland
Austria0
Sweden
Belgium
Norway
Luxembourg
Denmark
Germany (West)
Italy
The Netherlands
Canada
France
United Kingdom
Spain
Australia
A. OECD Countries
Switzerland
Ireland
United States
B. CEE Transition Countries
Slovak Republic
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Year
1991
1987
1992
1992
1991
1985
1992
1984
1991
1991
1991
1984
1986
1990
1989
1982
1987
1991
1992
1992
1991
1992
Gini (l)a
0.223
0.227
0.229
0.230
0.233
0.238
0.240
0.250
0.255
0271
0.286
0.295
0.304
0.308
0.309
0.323
0.330
0.343
0.189
0.208
0.289
0.291
Gini (2)b
0.223
0227
0.229
0.230
0.233
0.238
0.239
0.249
0.255
0.268
0.285
0.294
0.303
0.306
0.308
0.311
0.328
0.343
0.189
0.207
0.289
0.290
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Country Year Gini (l)a Gini (2)b
Russia 1992 0.437 0.393
C. Taiwan and Israel
Republic of China/Taiwan
Israel
1991
1992
0.302
0.305
0.300
0.305
SOURCE. Authors' tabulation of data m the Luxembourg Income Study
a. Gmi (1) = Gini coefficient for equivalent disposable income (El) where El = DPI/S S = family
size, E = 0 5, person weighted, bottom-coded at 1 percent mean DPI.
b. Gini (2) = Gini (1) top-coded at 10 times median disposable income
c Austria excludes the self-employed
coded, Russia still has the highest Gini and the ranking of nations is 
unaffected.
Based on these data, there is a wider range of disposable income 
inequality in the five CEE transition countries than in the major—and 
much richer—OECD nations. It is interesting that Russia, the CEE 
nation that experienced the most rapid transition to a market economy, 
has the highest level of inequality, while inequality is the least in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics where the transition to a market economy 
has been considerably slower (the "velvet revolution"). Finally, the 
Republic of China and Israel have inequality levels near the middle of 
the OECD range, with Ginis very similar to that found in the United 
Kingdom.
The Comparative Trend in Income Inequality
In this section we lay out the facts of how income inequality has 
changed over the past fifteen to twenty-five years in major modern 
nations. Studies of the recent trends in income inequality in different 
nations are listed in table 3. 10 While the various studies surveyed use 
different income and inequality measures and cover different periods, 
they are sufficiently robust to paint a picture of overall changes in ine 
quality during the 1980s and into the early 1990s in a large number of 
nations." These series cover a reasonable time span and the data them 
selves are internally consistent over time. Therefore, they give an indi-
Table 3. Changes in Market and Disposable Income Inequality
Country
United Kingdom
United States
Sweden
Hungary
Poland
Czech Republic
Australia
New Zealand
Japan
Denmark
Slovak Republic
The Netherlands
Norway
Belgium
Source
Goodman and Webb (1994) 
Atkinson (1993)
Gottschalk and Danziger (1995) 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1995, 1995a)
Gustafsson and Palmer (1993)
Torrey, Smeeding, and Bailey (1995)
Torrey, Smeeding, and Bailey (1995)
Torrey, Smeeding, and Bailey (1995)
Saunders (1994)
Saunders (1994)
Tachabanaki and Yagi (1995) 
Bauer and Mason (1992)
LIS (1996)
Torrey, Smeeding, and Bailey (1995)
Central Bureau of Statistics (1993) 
Muffells and Nellison (1993)
Epland (1992)
Cantillon, et al. (1994)
Period
1981-
1980-
1987-
1987-
1987-
1980-
1981-
1981-
1987-
1980-
1981-
1982-
1985-
1991
1992
1992
1992
1992
1989
1989
1990
1992
1992
1989
1989
1992
Disposable 
Market income income 
inequality9 inequality
++++
+++ +++
+++ +++
n.a. +++
n.a. ++
n.a. ++
++ ++
+ ++
+ ++
++ ++
n.a. +
+ +
+ +
+ +
Canada Beach and Slottsve (1994) 
Statistics Canada
1980 -1992
Israel
Finland
France
Republic of China
Portugal
Spain
Ireland
West Germany
Italy
LIS (1995)
Uusitalo(1994)
Concialdt (1993)
LIS (1995)
Rodrigues (1993)
LIS (1995)
Callan and Nolan (1993)
Burkhauser and Poupore (1994) 
Hauser and Becker (1993)
Brandohni and Sestito (1993) 
Erickson and Ichino (1992)
1979-
1981-
1979-
1981-
1980-
1980-
1980-
1983-
1976-
1992 +
1992 +++
1989 0
1991 0
1990 0
1990 n.a.
1987 +
1990 +
1991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
—
NOTE See Smeeding and Gottschalk (1995, table A-1) for actual figures.
Designation Interpretation
— small decline
0 zero
+ small increase
++ Moderate increase
+++ large increase
++++ extremely large increase
Range of change in Gini
-5 percent or more
-4 to +4 percent 
5 to 10 percent 
10 to 15 percent 
16 to 29 percent 
30 percent or more
a Some studies show changes in overall earnings inequality, others show changes in market income inequality, and still others do not discuss market 
income changes at all
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cation of the relative trends in different countries. Our evaluation of the 
magnitude and direction of these changes can be found in column five 
of table 3. These evaluations are based on the Gini coefficients that are 
used in all the studies reviewed here. Countries are listed in order of 
change in disposable income inequality from largest to smallest 
change. Where they are available from the same studies, we also 
present data on the trend in market income inequality in each nation.
Both the United Kingdom and the United States experienced a sub 
stantial rise in inequality during the 1980s, with the increase in the 
United Kingdom being much greater over this time period. Whereas 
trends in earnings inequality were similar in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the time paths for changes in the distribution of fam 
ily income were markedly different. In the United Kingdom, income 
inequality fell through the mid-1970s, but the Gini coefficient rose by 
more than 30 percent between 1978 and 1991. This is almost double 
the increase over two decades in the United States, and more than dou 
ble the decline in the United Kingdom from 1949 to 1976. 12 In fact by 
1991, the overall level of income inequality in the United Kingdom 
exceeded the level found in Canada, a much larger nation.
While starting from a much lower level of inequality, Sweden expe 
rienced a pattern of change in inequality similar to that in the United 
Kingdom, downward until 1981, then fairly level during the 1980s, 
with a sharp increase in the early 1990s. But though the Swedish Gini 
increased by about 20 percent from 1980 to 1992, the Swedish income 
distribution remained considerably more equal than either that of the 
United States or the United Kingdom. 13 - 14
The changes experienced by Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Poland—28, 14, and 12 percent respectively, over a shorter period 
(three and five years, respectively)—are closer to our expectations. 
While the Hungarian change is very large, the changes found in Poland 
and in the Czech Republic are not much different from that found in 
the United Kingdom over the 1986-1991 period or in Sweden from 
1988 to 1993.
In Australia, Denmark, and Japan (and in Poland though over a 
shorter period), the upward trend over the 1980s is slightly less than 
that experienced in the United States and Sweden. The same is true in 
New Zealand, though all of the increases here came during the late 
1980s (Saunders 1994). 15 In Belgium, the Netherlands, the Slovak
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Republic, and Norway, the overall increase in inequality was about 5 
percent from 1980 to 1990. In many nations—Canada, Ireland, Israel, 
Portugal, Taiwan, Finland, and France—there was little or no change in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. And income inequality actually declined 
slightly in Italy during the 1980s. 16
It is also noteworthy that there appears to be no apparent relation 
between the trend over the 1980s and the overall level of inequality at 
the start of the period. Inequality has increased both in the United 
States, with a very high level of inequality even before the increase, 
and in Sweden, which started from a much lower level of inequality. 
Inequality has fallen in Italy, but risen greatly in the United Kingdom, 
with both countries occupying intermediate inequality positions in the 
mid-1980s (table 1).
Nor is there a consistent "group country" story. Among the Scandi 
navian nations, Sweden experienced a rapid rise in inequality in the 
early 1990s, while Finland did not. In Europe we find large secular 
increases in inequality in the United Kingdom, smaller increases in 
Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands, but stasis in Germany, Portu 
gal, Ireland, and France, with secular decreases in Italy. Canada experi 
enced only mild increases in inequality of family income while the 
United States experienced much larger increases despite similar market 
forces affecting market incomes in both countries (Hanratty and Blank 
1993). And finally, if there is a regional pattern, it is to be found among 
the CEE nations, with inequality rising in Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic near the upper end of the range found in Western 
nations over similar periods.
Exploring Differences in Levels and Trends
The story of why we observe these differences in levels and trends 
in inequality is necessarily incomplete because of the confluence of 
market, demographic, institutional, and policy changes. The inclusion 
of multiple income sources received by multiple individuals thwarts 
attempts to identify the causal links that lead to variations across coun 
tries and over time in the distribution of total post-tax and transfer fam 
ily income. There is ample evidence that family members take account
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of all sources of income available to the family in deciding not only 
how much each member might work in a market setting, but also how 
to structure living arrangements. Moreover, governments themselves 
react differently to market income changes via changes in redistribu 
tion (tax and transfer) policy, and via other policies (e.g., macroeco- 
nomic policy or micro policies such as government employment). This 
leads to decision-making processes that are much too complex to be 
treated in a unified causal framework at this time. We therefore limit 
ourselves to a simple descriptive exercise that focuses on the difference 
in inequality before and after government redistribution.
Differences in the Level of Inequality of Market Income and 
Disposable Income
Table 4 shows the Gini coefficient for market income (pre-tax and 
transfer), disposable income (post-tax and transfer) and the difference 
between these two measures of inequality. Since taxes and transfers 
affect economic behavior, this difference reflects the net effect of direct 
taxation (income and employee social security taxes) and government 
transfer benefits. Clearly, both coefficients vary substantially across 
countries. The differences between these two Ginis also fall in a wide 
range; the sample high of 0.245 (Sweden) is more than ten times the 
sample low of 0.023 (Taiwan).
Note that the disposable income Gini (DPI) is not closely related to 
the level of inequality in market income (MI). For example, with MI 
Ginis less than 0.34, Finland, Italy, and Taiwan have the least amount 
of inequality in market income. But, with DPI Ginis of 0.233 and 0.255 
respectively, Finland and Italy have significantly less inequality in dis 
posable income than Taiwan, whose DPI Gini (0.302) is not much less 
than its MI Gini (0.325). Similarly, Hungary, France, Poland, and Can 
ada all have DPI Ginis in the 0.285 - 0.295 range, but MI Ginis that run 
from 0.415 to 0.470. The weak relationship between a country's DPI 
and MI Ginis is suggested by the scatter in figure 1 and confirmed by 
the low multiple correlation coefficient (0.282) of these two series.
These data suggest that there is a wide variety of experiences under 
lying the relationship between inequality in market income and ine 
quality in disposable income. And although differential behavioral 
responses to redistribution may contribute to the range of these DPI
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Table 4. Inequality in Disposable and Market Income in Twenty-Four 
Nations
Country
Slovak Republic
Czech Republic
Finland
Sweden
Belgium
Norway
Luxembourg
Denmark
Germany
Italy
The Netherlands
Canada
Hungary
Poland
France
Taiwan
United Kingdom
Israel
Spain
Australia
Switzerland
Ireland
United States
Russia RLMS
Year
1992
1992
1991
1992
1992
1991
1985
1992
1984
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
1984
1991
1986
1992
1990
1990
1982
1987
1991
1992
Abbreviation
SR92
CZ92
FI91
SW92
BE92
NO91
LX85
DK92
GE84
IT91
NL91
CN91
HU91
PL92
FR84
RC91
UK86
IS92
SP90
AS90
CH82
IR87
US91
RL92
DPI Gini
0.189
0.208
0.233
0.229
0.230
0.233
0.238
0.240
0.250
0.255
0.271
0.286
0.289
0.291
0.295
0.302
0.304
0.305
0.308
0.309
0.323
0.330
0.343
0.440
MI Gini
0.402
0.411
0.337
0.474
0.456
0.378
0.380
0.430
0.428
0.330
0.414
0.415
0.491
0.444
0.470
0.325
0.488
0.453
0.429
0.437
0.406
0.503
0.449
0.542
Difference
0.213
0.203
0.114
0.245
0.226
0.145
0.142
0.191
0.178
0.075
0.143
0.129
0.202
0.154
0.175
0.023
0.185
0.147
0.121
0.128
0.083
0.174
0.107
0.102
SOURCE Author's tabulation of Luxembourg Income Study.
NOTE. Austria is omitted because MI cannot be computed in the LIS datasets.
Figure 1. Market Income and Disposable Income Inequality
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Ginis, we suspect that the difference between a country's MI and DPI 
Ginis is more likely to be a product of its redistributive policy. Ginis, 
we suspect that the difference between a country's MI and DPI Ginis is 
more likely to be a product of its redistributive policy.
Changes in Inequality Over Time
In the nations studied here, changes in earned income inequality 
appear to be the prime force behind changes in market income inequal 
ity during the 1980s. With earnings roughly at or above 70 percent of 
market income in most modern nations, this is to be expected. Other 
market forces along with demographic and social developments also 
affected market income inequality, though to a lesser degree. However, 
while market income changes are dominant, they do not tell the whole 
story. By the mid-1980s, more than 25 percent of all households in 
major OECD nations depended on something other than earnings as 
the primary source of their incomes. In nations such as the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden, this figure reached 30 percent 
(Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995b, table 8).
The crude evidence in table 3 indicates that the trends in disposable 
income inequality mirror the trends in market income inequality in 
most nations. In thirteen of the nineteen nations in which the changes 
in both market and disposable income inequality have been estimated, 
the change in both measures of inequality has the same sign. The link 
between changes in tax and transfer policy and changes in the distribu 
tion of disposable income is not very well understood at this time. 17 In 
countries with progressive tax and transfer systems, the effect of 
changes in taxes paid and transfers received would largely offset the 
effect of any changes in market income on the distribution of dispos 
able income. In some countries, especially Finland, but also in Israel, 
Spain, Ireland, Canada, and Germany, there was no appreciable 
increase in the inequality of disposable income. Thus, the tax and 
transfer systems in place in these nations, or the redistributive policies 
adopted in the 1980s in response to increasing inequality in market 
incomes, were effective in preventing rising disposable income ine 
quality. In contrast, in six nations inequality in disposable income kept 
pace with inequality in market income. That the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, Denmark, and Japan experienced increases in disposable
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income inequality that exceeded the increases in market income ine 
quality begs the question of whether there were retrenchments in tax/ 
transfer program progressivity over the relevant period.
Since in fifteen of the nineteen countries for which there are data, 
market income inequality increased during the 1980s, it seems that ris 
ing market income inequality was a problem confronted by most if not 
all industrialized economies. This suggests that some of the factors 
behind these developments are common to all these nations. Candi 
dates for these factors might be the growing volume and importance of 
international trade and a more laissez faire approach to domestic eco 
nomic policy.
Summary and Research Implications
The literature on cross-national levels and trends in earning and 
income inequality is young but growing rapidly. Concerns about earn 
ings inequality and joblessness have moved to the top of the social pol 
icy agenda in modern OECD nations. Over the past decade, new data 
resources have expanded to meet these interests. While some of these 
permit a broad-brush overview of the field, the growing research inter 
est in this area has spawned a large number of collaborative efforts to 
examine a small number of nations in much greater detail. In this paper 
we attempted to briefly summarize both what can be learned from the 
new resources such as LIS and also from the growing literature on 
national and cross-national trends in inequality.
We find a wide range of levels of income inequality across the 
twenty-five nations studied here. The range of inequality among OECD 
nations is very large, and the range among CEE nations appears to be 
larger still. Government redistribution has a measurable effect on over 
all income inequality, reducing market income-based measures com 
pared to disposable income measures in every nation. However, 
countries with very similar disposable income inequality often have 
very different inequality of market income and vice versa. These differ 
ences are yet to be fully explained.
Trends in overall income inequality diverge across nations in inter 
esting ways. One finds large increases in inequality among very differ-
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ent nations: two Anglo-Saxon nations (the United Kingdom and the 
United States), one Scandinavian nation (Sweden), and one CEE 
nation (Hungary) exhibit the largest increases in measured income ine 
quality from roughly 1980 to 1992. In contrast, other Anglo-Saxon 
(e.g., Canada), European (several), and Scandinavian (e.g., Finland) 
nations have experienced a much smaller change in inequality while 
some nations have shown no measurable change in inequality.
In fact, the most distinctive changes in income distribution in mod 
ern OECD nations seem to have taken place in the United Kingdom 
and in the United States, where there has been a hollowing out of the 
middle of distribution, marked by an increasing fraction of the popula 
tion both in upper and lower income groups relative to overall median 
income. Falling real wages for low-skill, low-income families and the 
growth in the number of females heading families juxtaposed against 
rising wages for well-educated men and women and assortative mating 
were the primary factors accounting for the increase in inequality in 
the United States. 18 In the United Kingdom, while real earnings still 
grew at the bottom of the earnings distribution, unemployment and ris 
ing numbers of single parents were important in building a large group 
at the bottom of the distribution. At the other end of the British income 
distribution, higher earnings for well-educated men and women, rising 
income from financial capital, and self-employment income all play a 
significant role in explaining the growing income share of high-income 
people. However, while the hollowing out or polarization of distribu 
tions in the United States and the United Kingdom is clear, these same 
patterns are not obvious in other OECD or LIS countries. 19
Additional research is needed to further investigate the patterns 
found here to provide a better overall theory of income distribution. 
Comparisons of real income differences across countries are also 
instructive. Such comparisons as these, while difficult to make, can add 
a great deal in cases where one wishes to compare nations with similar 
overall levels of production and economic output (per capita GDP) to 
one another (see Smeeding and Gottschalk 1995). We also need to 
build better structural models of income distribution and redistribution 
that can be applied across and within nations. Atkinson's (1994) self- 
characterization of his review of the economic theory of income distri 
bution is "a prospectus for a yet-unwritten book rather than a self-con 
tained essay," a statement that I heartily endorse.
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tion under #SBR-9022192, and #SBR-9511521.1 retain responsibility for all errors of omission or 
commission
1. In Scandinavia and Europe, the debate is about jobs and income support levels that are pro 
ducing record budget deficits In the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, the debate is 
about budget deficits and fairness.
2. In order to realize the full range of choices and their potential applications, the larger stud 
ies need to be consulted (Atkmson, Rainwater, and Smeedmg 1995a, chapters 2, 3, and appendi 
ces 2-6; Gottschalk and Smeedmg 1995). In order to expand the realm of inquiry to wealth or to 
consumption, other sources need to be consulted (e.g., Wolff 1994, 1995, Hagenaars, deVos, and 
Zaidi 1994, Deaton and Paxson 1994) Moreover, the range of nations studied is confined to those 
for which we have data that have attained a reasonable level of comparability Many CEE nations 
and Asian nations are not covered here For additional information on their experiences, see Mil- 
anovic (1995) and Birdsall, Ross, and Sabot (1995).
3 For a discussion of the problems of comparability across countries, see, among others, 
Atkmson, Rainwater, and Smeedmg (1995a); Buhmann et al. (1988); Smeedmg, Rainwater, and 
O'Higgms (1990). The issue of international standards for income distribution studies is also 
being addressed by the Luxembourg Income Study Project
4 Smeedmg et al (1993) covers Australia, Canada, West Germany, United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and United States around 1980
5 In many CEE nations we have the option of adding production for own consumption 
(mainly among rural farm families), the value of goods produced and bartered, and in-kind trans 
fers (food, appliances, etc.) received from outside the household However, these amounts are not 
included here.
6. Our comparisons of income distribution, and of the effect of taxes and transfers on inequal 
ity, use equivalence scales to adjust families for differences in economic need as reflected by fam 
ily size These scales have been found to systematically affect the level of overall inequality, but 
not its pattern See Atkmson, Rainwater, and Smeedmg (1995a, chapter 4) See also Buhmann et 
al (1988)
7. We compare incomes by considering household disposable income (or market income) per 
equivalent adult, using an "intermediate" equivalence scale of household size raised to the power
P Fof a half (or S where E = 5) Thus, adjusted income equals unadjusted income divided by S 
Many recent cross-national studies of inequality and poverty have used this value for E (Atkmson, 
Rainwater, and Smeedmg 1995; Hagenaars, deVos, and Zaidi 1994; Forster, 1993, 1994 )
8 Two sets of figures are presented, one bottom-coded at 1 percent of median disposable 
income, the other top-coded at 10 times median income
9 Atkmson, Rainwater, and Smeedmg (1995a, chapter 4) also present alternative summary 
index measures of inequality (the Atkmson ratio), and measures of Lorenz-dommance
10 These trends are drawn from the primary studies shown in table 3 and summarized numer 
ically in Smeedmg and Gottschalk (1995, table A-l) Table A-l also allows the reader to make 
longer-term comparisons of inequality for nations with such data
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11 It should be emphasized that these figures are not comparable across countnes One can 
draw no conclusions from these estimates about the relative degree of inequality in different coun 
tnes In each case, the estimates are drawn from national studies of income inequality that are not 
designed for purposes of international comparison, and they are not necessarily based on the same 
concepts of income or method of calculation. See Smeedmg and Gottschalk (1995, table A-l) for 
additional details. While we have used the LIS data for inequality comparisons across a subset of 
these nations where other national studies are not available, the LIS data are less complete in 
terms of years studied than are those from the other national studies cited here. Where LIS trend 
data is available, however, it supports the findings shown in table 3.
12. See Atkmson (1993, table 1) and also Goodman and Webb (1994), who report similar 
results.
13 We have several sources of information on the trend in Swedish income inequality, includ 
ing Gustafsson and Palmer (1993) and Bjorklund and Freeman (1994) The former show large 
increases in the Gmi, particularly in 1990 and 1991 The latter appear to show a smaller increase 
in inequality using data through 1992, but do not use Ginis and compute only subgroup inequality 
trends, excluding the aged and persons aged 18 and 19. Gmi estimates provided directly by Kjell 
Jansson of Statistics Sweden indicate that the trend in overall inequality is similar to that shown in 
Gustafsson and Palmer (1993).
14 Were we to show not percentage change but percentage point change in inequality, Swe 
den may fare a bit better than shown here. A 15 percentage point change in the Swedish 1991 Gmi 
of 0 229 or 0 034, is less than a 10 percent change in the U S 1991 Gmi of 0.343
15 While the Polish data are consistent from 1987 through 1992, it is not entirely clear that 
the Polish household budget survey has adequately captured changes in entrepreneurial incomes 
since 1990 Thus, the Polish results must be cautiously interpreted
16 Gardmer (1993) goes back further than we, to the 1980s, noting a "U"-shaped pattern of 
inequality change in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the Netherlands, thus cap 
turing the decrease in inequality that occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s in these nations
17 This conclusion draws heavily on Gottschalk and Smeedmg (1996), who in turn base their 
conclusions on matenal from Gottschalk, Gustafsson, and Palmer (1995), OECD (1994), Gar- 
diner (1993), Ploug and Kvist (1994), Messere (1994), and Commission of the European Commu 
nity (1993a, 1993b).
18 The extend to which real incomes have actually fallen among Amencan families and the 
amount of that decrease depends on the measure and on the time period Depending on the period 
chosen, the decrease has been large (e g., substantial declines by 40 percent of persons from 1973 
to 1994 according to Karoly 1995) or small (e g., very small declines for less than 25 percent of 
persons from 1979 to 1989 according to Burkhauser et al 1996). Still the large majority of the 
real income gams in America during the 1980s and 1990s have gone to those at or near the top of 
the income distribution
19. See Beach and Slottsve (1994) and Foster and Wolfson (1994) on Canada, for the United 
Kingdom see Jenkms (1994); and for the United States see U.S Bureau of the Census (1995) and 
Duncan, Smeedmg, and Rodgers (1994) Recent analyses using the LIS database also fail to find 
such a pattern in any other modern OECD nation through 1992
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From Parent to Child
Intergenerational Relations 
and Intrahousehold Allocations
Jere R. Behrman 
University of Pennsylvania
Perceptions are widespread that in the United States there has been 
increasing inequality and persistent, or perhaps increasing, poverty in 
recent years. The family is viewed as critical in the determination of 
individuals' income generation capacities, particularly through human 
resource investments in schooling, but also through the home environ 
ment and other channels. In this chapter, I address two sets of questions 
that are related to these perceptions.
First, what is the extent of intergenerational mobility? How associ 
ated across generations is income? There have long been different 
views on the answers to these questions. On the one hand, there are 
perceptions of many observers dating at least back to de Tocqueville 
that the United States is an open society in which mobility is relatively 
great, with reinforcement by the Horatio Alger stories of advancement 
from the mailroom to the board room and many anecdotes about "rags 
to riches" in one generation (and sometimes back to rags in another). 
On the other hand, there are allegations that often children are "chips 
off the old block," "biology is destiny," and "the acorn falls close to the 
trunk." There is an intergenerational transfer of economic status, with 
poor parents having poor children, while the children of the rich are 
born "with a silver spoon in their mouths," and according to Herrnstein 
and Murray in The Bell Curve (1994), the heritability of intelligence 
and perhaps other traits further limits intergenerational mobility.
Second, what is the nature of intrafamily allocations, particularly of 
schooling, among children? Are such allocations in response to genetic 
endowments? Do they tend to reinforce those endowments so that bet 
ter-endowed children receive more, thus increasing earnings inequal 
ity? Or do they compensate for such endowments? If schooling 
allocations reinforce such endowments, do financial transfers from par 
ents to children compensate for the earnings differentials? In making
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these allocations do parents weigh all children equally, or do they pre 
fer some children identified, perhaps, by gender or birth order?
The objective of this chapter is to consider some elements of how 
social scientists describe and analyze phenomena related to these two 
sets of questions. A central point is that it is difficult to identify causal 
ity from associations in data that reflect behavioral choices made in 
part in response to factors that are not observed in the data by analysts. 
A key example is provided by child genetic endowments related to 
such attributes as ability, personality, persistence, and motivation. If 
parents make allocations of schooling in part in response to such 
endowments and these endowments also have direct effects on earn 
ings, then the association between schooling and earnings does not 
reflect simply the impact of schooling on earnings, but also the effects 
of the unobserved endowments on earnings to the extent that they are 
correlated with schooling. Our grandmothers know that Mary did well 
in school because she was smart and diligent, and that these character 
istics—in addition to schooling—served her well in the job market. 
Therefore, to estimate the impact of schooling per se on Mary's earn 
ings there would have to be control for her smartness and diligence, 
control that simple associations do not provide.
Describing Intergenerational Associations
How strong are intergenerational associations? As noted, popular 
characterizations range considerably, from very low ones implied by 
Horatio Alger stories and other "rages to riches" fables, to very high 
ones implied by the "intergenerational culture of poverty" and The Bell 
Curve characterizations. Two major means of describing such associa 
tions are through correlation coefficients and through heritability esti 
mates.
Intergenerational correlation exists when some characteristic of the 
parents is a determinant of that characteristic for their children. For 
instance, it could be that the income of a child is dependent on that of 
its parents. If so, a person's economic status is not entirely the product 
of his or her abilities and choices; those of his parents also impact on 
the child's income. If a positive relationship between the incomes of
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parents and children exists, then the children of low-income parents 
would, on average, be poorer than the children of high-income parents. 
But while such a relationship may inhibit social mobility, it does not 
imply a class society, or that economic status will be passed on from 
generation to generation.
To illustrate, suppose that the line labeled T in figure 1, the 45° line, 
shows the relationship between the income of parents and children, 
ceteris paribus. Then there is absolutely no social mobility. The chil 
dren's income will always equal the parents' income. On the other 
hand, suppose the T' line indicates how a child's income changes as 
the income of the parents changes. In this case, though the children of 
high/low income parents tend to have high/low incomes, over succes 
sive generations a family's income converges to Y. In this society, there 
is regression toward the mean. However, this process may not be par 
ticularly rapid. For example, if Y is $40,000 and the slope of T' is 0.8, 
it takes eight generations for a family's income to increase from 
$10,000 to $34,500.
Figure 1. Parental-Child Income Positively Correlated
Child Income T 1
Parental Income
What is the evidence regarding the extent of intergenerational par 
ent-child income correlations in the United States? There are relatively 
few estimates because not many data sets have information on the 
incomes of two generations (see estimates and surveys in Becker and
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Tomes 1986 and Behrman and Taubman 1985). Until recently, the 
available studies were all based on one year of data. These studies indi 
cated a correlation of about 0.2, that for every additional dollar of 
parental income, child income tended to increase by about 20 cents. 
This suggests a positive association between parental and family 
income, but not an overwhelming one. Such estimates suggest consid 
erable intergenerational mobility, with many Horatio Algers and 
reverse Horatio Algers.
One problem with these estimates, however, is that one year of 
reported income data may not represent very well income over longer 
periods of time. There may be reporting errors as well as fluctuations in 
incomes from year to year because of fluctuations in the economy, the 
luck of individuals, or choices that people make that affect their 
incomes. Such fluctuations mean that estimates based on one year are 
likely to understate the extent of the intergenerational income associa 
tions over longer periods. It would seem then that the associations over 
periods longer than a year are what is of interest in describing intergen 
erational mobility. The question of primary interest is whether children 
who have relatively high-income parents during the children's child 
hood years are likely to have relatively high income themselves over 
their adult years, not for any particular year.
Recently data sets have been available in which income information 
on parents and on their adult children has been collected for a number 
of years. These data permit the exploration of the possibility that previ 
ous studies overestimated intergenerational mobility because they used 
only one year of income data. Estimates made from these data find that 
using up to ten years of income data makes a considerable difference in 
the estimated intergenerational correlation, and in fact, cause it to 
roughly double to about 0.4, with the implication that for every addi 
tional dollar of parental income child income is about 40 cents higher 
(Behrman and Taubman 1990; Solon 1992; Zimmermann 1992). Thus, 
controlling for something as simple as the fluctuations in income from 
year to year makes a considerable difference in the estimates of inter 
generational mobility and leads to estimates of considerably less 
mobility and considerably stronger familial associations.
Heritability estimates indicate the proportion of the total variance in 
some observed outcome (phenotype) such as income that is associated 
with the variance in genetic endowments (genotype). Standard esti-
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mates assume that the phenotype is related to the genotype and to other 
determinants in a simple linear relation in which the genetic effects and 
the other relevant factors each can be summarized in one indicator, 
with no interaction between them. Such estimates are common in the 
literature that attempts to identify the importance of "nature" (genetic 
endowments) versus "nurture" (other influences on the phenotype, 
including behavioral choices such as schooling investments). Heritabil- 
ity estimates can range in value from 0 to 1, with the variance in geno 
type a larger share of the variance in phenotype the higher the estimate.
Heritability estimates usually are obtained from data on phenotype 
of twins by using the fact that identical twins have identical genetic 
endowments but fraternal twins have differing genetic endowments. 
Therefore, if genetic endowments are important, phenotypes are more 
similar for identical twins than for fraternal twins. For example, for the 
National Academy of Science-National Research Council sample of 
white male twins born in the United States between 1917 and 1927 
who subsequently served in the military, the correlation in earnings is 
0.56 for identical twins and 0.32 for fraternal twins, which implies a 
heritability estimate of 0.48.' That is, the ratio of the variation in earn 
ings due to variations in genotypes is about half of the total variation in 
earnings. In The Bell Curve, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) claim that 
most measures of heritability for IQ in the United States recently tend 
to be in the range of 0.4 to 0.8. Estimates of these magnitudes often 
have been interpreted to mean that nature (genotypes) is quite impor 
tant, leaving little scope for the impact of nurture through, for example, 
schooling. Herrnstein and Murray give such an interpretation.
But changes in nurture may have large impacts even if heritability 
estimates are high. Consider, for illustration, the situation in which 
there are only two genotypes (G] and G2), each of which accounts for 
half of the population. Both phenotypes respond to "nurture" as in fig 
ure 2. In this figure, income is measured on the vertical axis and nur 
ture is measured on the horizontal axis. Both genotypes respond 
positively to nurture, so the income lines for each of the genotypes is 
upward-sloping. But genotype 2 is assumed to have greater genetic 
endowments, so the line for this genotype is higher than for genotype 
1. Assume further that half of the members of each genotype are 
exposed to nurture level 1 and half are exposed to nurture level 2. 
Therefore, one quarter of the population will have the income-geno-
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type-nurture combinations indicated by each of the points marked a, b, 
c, and d. Then, as figure 2 is drawn, the heritability estimate will be 
high. Most of the observed variation in income is due to the difference 
between the two genotypes.
Figure 2. High Heritability But Still Large Impact of Changing 
"Nurture"
Phenotype 
(Income)
Nurture
But this does not mean that nurture has no effect. To the contrary, 
increasing nurture—say, by increasing schooling—has a positive effect 
on income. The high value of heritability only reflects the relatively 
small difference between nurture levels 1 and 2. Indeed, the heritability 
estimate would be much smaller if the same two genotypes were 
divided equally between nurture levels 1 and 3 instead of between 1 
and 2. The basic point is that to evaluate the impact of nurture through 
schools or other means, the slopes of the lines are what are of interest. 
This impact may be large whether the heritability estimate is large or 
small. The small estimate for heritability does not tell us what would 
happen if nurture were to be changed. But often the literature on 
"nature versus nurture" is not clear on this critical point. For example, 
Herrnstein and Murray (1994) suggest that because heritability esti-
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mates are high, schooling and other forms of nurture are not very effec 
tive. As is illustrated in figure 2, this is not a logical deduction.
What Underlies Family Allocations among Children?
The descriptions provided by correlations and heritability estimates 
summarized earlier are consistent with families being important in 
determining children's economic experiences as adults. This raises 
questions about how families allocate resources among children. For 
example, do families allocate human resources, such as schooling, in 
response to children's genetic endowments? Do they allocate resources 
so as to reinforce or to compensate for differences in genetic endow 
ments? Do they have greater concern about some children—say, identi 
fied by sex or birth order—than others?
Economists have developed different models of intrahousehold allo 
cations that provide a framework for thinking about such questions. 
Such frameworks are useful because it is difficult to analyze these (and 
other) behaviors that in part are in response to variables not observable 
by social scientists but that affect the decisions being made—in this 
case, genetic endowments of children. Because of such unobservable 
variables, one cannot simply look at associations (correlations) among 
observed variables in order to answer questions such as those posed 
above. I consider two models of intrahousehold allocations below in 
which parents make the decisions regarding allocations of human 
resources among their children. 2 Before turning to these models, how 
ever, I introduce some basic elements common to the models.
In these models, parents are assumed to maximize their satisfaction 
by deciding how much to invest in the schooling of each of their chil 
dren. Parents are interested in their own consumption, but in order to 
sharpen considerations about how they allocate resources among their 
children, I assume that the allocation of resources among the children 
is separable from the parents' decision about how they themselves con 
sume. I also assume that the parents' satisfaction increases as any 
child's income rises, ceteris paribus.
As in any economic model of household choice, the incomes that 
parents "choose" for their children depend on the exact nature of
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parental preferences and a budget constraint—in this case, the income 
possibilities frontier, those combinations of incomes that are attainable 
by the children. The income possibilities frontier would presumably 
have the appearance of the textbook production possibilities frontier; 
its precise curvature and position would depend on the endowments of 
each child, the resources that the parents devote to their children, the 
prices of schooling, and so forth.
Figure 3 shows how the parents' preferences and the income possi 
bilities frontier interact to determine each child's income. Two charac 
teristics of equal-satisfaction curves are of interest. First, there is the 
"distribution-total income" tradeoff, which relates to the curvature of 
the equal-satisfaction curves. If equal-satisfaction curves are straight 
lines, parents are only concerned with the total income of their chil 
dren. The distribution of this income among the children is unimpor 
tant to the parents. In contrast, if these curves are rectangular (L- 
shaped), parental satisfaction increases only if the incomes of both 
children increase. In this case, the primary concern is with how income 
is distributed between children. If these curves have the textbook cur 
vature of indifference curves, both total income and its distribution are 
of concern to parents.
Figure 3. Constrained Maximization of Parental Satisfaction Regarding 
Child Income
Income
of 
Child 1
Income Possibilities 
I Frontier
Income of Child 2
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A second characteristic of these curves that merits attention is their 
symmetry, or lack thereof. These curves are symmetric if switching the 
incomes of two children has no effect on the satisfaction of their par 
ents. If equal-satisfaction curves do not have this property, parents care 
which child receives the higher income when some total income is dis 
tributed between the two children. If equal-satisfaction curves are sym 
metric and children have equal endowments, parents will invest in the 
education of their children and make financial transfer so as to produce 
equal incomes for their children. However, if either of these conditions 
do not hold, income equality will not necessarily obtain.
Currently, the wealth model (Becker and Tomes 1976) is the para 
digm that economists most commonly use to analyze intrafamily allo 
cation of resources. In the wealth model, parents are concerned only 
with the total wealth of each child, not with its composition of sources. 
Therefore, they do not distinguish between earned income and 
unearned income. If parents both invest in the schooling of their chil 
dren and transfer financial and physical assets to their children, they do 
so in order to maximize the total wealth of the children. This of course 
requires that parents increase their investment in the education of a 
child as long as the marginal rate of return to that investment exceeds 
the rate of return on financial assets.
In the wealth model, as originally presented by Becker and Tomes, it 
is assumed that parents provide enough resources to their children that 
all children receive financial transfers in addition to wealth-maximiz 
ing investments in schooling. Parents invest in the human capital of 
each child until the marginal rate of return to education is driven down 
to the rate of return on financial assets; any additional resources pro 
vided to children take the form of transfers such as gifts and bequests. 
Parents with more than one child and equal concern for all their chil 
dren (symmetric equal-satisfaction curves) use transfers to offset fully 
inequalities in their children's earnings. Hence, the wealth model with 
equal concern predicts a pattern of unequal earnings, unequal transfers, 
and equal wealth. But parents' investments in their children's human 
capital are socially efficient provided there are no externalities and 
well-functioning capital markets.
However, the assumption that parents are rich enough and altruistic 
enough that they provide all of their children the wealth-maximizing 
level of schooling is critical (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 1995). If
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parents do not allocate "enough" resources to their children, then some 
children receive less than the socially efficient level of human capital, 
and those children receive zero transfer. In this case, (a) schooling 
investments are not efficient, and (b) even if parents have equal con 
cern, the incomes of the children are not equalized because the child 
with greater endowments receives greater schooling investments and 
earns greater income, but transfers are not used to equalize total 
income between the children.
In contrast to Becker and Tomes, the separable earnings transfer 
(SET) model of Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982) assumes that 
parents care differently about income that their children earn from 
working than about income their children receive from clipping bond 
coupons. So, they consider the distribution of earnings among their 
children separably from the distribution of nonearnings income.
The SET model has two important different implications from those 
of the wealth model with substantial resources devoted to children as 
originally presented by Becker and Tomes. First, the SET model does 
not imply that human capital investments are efficient, even with well- 
functioning capital markets and no externalities. If parents value earn 
ings income more than nonearnings income, for example, they may 
invest more in the schooling of a child than wealth-maximizing. Sec 
ond, it does not imply that parents with equal concern for their children 
attempt to offset fully differences in earnings by allocating transfers 
unequally. The consideration of earnings separably from transfers in 
fact means that there is no relation between earnings gaps between sib 
lings and patterns of transfers received from parents. Therefore, rather 
than equal income among children in the same family with different 
endowments, the SET model generally implies unequal income. While 
these are important differences in comparison with the Becker and 
Tomes original formulation of the wealth model, the wealth model 
implications when parents do not devote enough resources to their chil 
dren to provide positive transfers to each are similar (though not identi 
cal since the SET model results are consistent with positive transfers).
Data limitations make it difficult to estimate critical parameters of 
either of these models directly or to distinguish empirically between 
the wealth model and the SET model. Some critical variables simply 
are not observable in any data set, namely endowments and marginal 
rates of return to schooling for individuals. Other data are only par-
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tially observed. For example, to assess these models it would be desir 
able to have lifetime transfers (inter vivos and bequests) received by all 
children in a family from their parents and lifetime schooling invest 
ments and earnings. But at best data sets provide a subset of this infor 
mation. Nevertheless, by using special data on adult siblings and in 
some cases specific assumptions about the underlying relations, some 
progress has been made in estimating critical dimensions of these 
intrahousehold allocation models. I discuss three examples.
First, conditional on particular functional forms for parental levels 
of satisfaction and for the impact of genetic endowments and schooling 
on earnings, estimates of the SET model provide insight into the total 
income-distribution tradeoff and unequal concern in the parental objec 
tive function underlying intrahousehold allocations (Behrman, Pollak 
and Taubman 1982, 1986; Behrman and Taubman 1986; Behrman 
1988a, 1988b). For the United States, these estimates indicate that 
investments in schooling are not determined solely by concerns about 
maximizing total income of the children: distribution also weighs 
heavily in intrafamily allocations. For rural India, a much poorer soci 
ety, similar results have been found for the allocation of nutrients 
among children during the surplus season when food is relatively abun 
dant, but during the lean season when food is scarce, allocation is 
determined almost entirely by productivity concerns.
Parents might provide unequal education to daughters and sons 
because their preferences favor children of one gender or because they 
know that the labor market rewards unequally women and men with 
the same ability and the same human capital. Estimates of the SET 
model show that the preferences of parents in the United States do not 
favor sons over daughters; indeed, if marriage market as well as labor 
market returns are incorporated into the analysis, the empirical evi 
dence suggests that parents' preferences give slightly more weight to 
daughters than to sons. These results contrast with the finding that 
there is unequal concern favoring sons in the lean season in rural India.
Birth-order effects have been widely discussed in the biological, 
psychological, and popular literatures. Lower birth-order children (i.e., 
older children) may benefit from developing in more adult-oriented 
environments and from teaching their younger siblings. Higher birth- 
order children, on the other hand, may benefit from having more expe 
rienced parents. Casual observation (perhaps primarily by older sib-
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lings) suggests that the youngest child is often spoiled by excessive 
parental attention and indulgence. Finally, birth order may be related to 
health because of the relationship between birth order and mother's 
age, with less healthy children borne by very young and very old moth 
ers.
Birth order may affect intrafamily allocation through preferences or 
through constraints. On the preference side, parents may fail to exhibit 
equal concern and instead favor the eldest or youngest child. On the 
constraint side, parents with many children may allocate less to each 
child, and borrowing constraints may vary over the parents' life cycle, 
differentially affecting children of different birth orders. Estimates of 
the SET model find that intrafamily allocations favor children of lower 
birth order both for the United States and for rural Indian in the lean 
season. For the United States, borrowing constraints are part of the 
explanation.
Second, an implication of the wealth model with high resources 
given to children and equal concern is that differences in income 
yielded by transfers of financial and physical assets given to children 
offset differences in labor market earnings of children in the same fam 
ily. The data, however, show that for most households the absolute 
magnitudes of gifts and bequests are insufficient to offset fully earn 
ings differentials among siblings (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 
1995; Menchik 1979, 1980, 1988; Wilhelm 1991). Moreover, the dom 
inant pattern for bequests—equal or almost equal bequests for all chil 
dren in the same family—is not consistent with bequests offsetting 
earnings differentials among children in the same family. Differences 
in inter vivos transfers to children do compensate a little for differences 
in their earnings, but offset very little of these differences. Finally, for 
families for which the resources devoted to children are not sufficient 
that all children receive transfers, the wealth model still implies that 
one child may receive transfers. But available data on bequests indi 
cates that it is rare that one but only one child receives bequests. Thus, 
all in all, the data on transfers to children, though fragmentary, does not 
provide much support for the wealth model. They are consistent, how 
ever, with the SET model.
Third, there are recent estimates, based on minimal assumptions, of 
whether intrahousehold allocations of schooling investments are in 
response to endowments and, if so, whether they reinforce endowment
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differentials or compensate for endowment differentials among sib 
lings. These estimates utilize data on adult identical and, in some cases, 
fraternal twins. 3 The essence of the procedures used to obtain these 
estimates is now illustrated with reference to the following relations.
Assume that earnings of the ith child (Ej) in a family depends lin 
early on that child's schooling (S,), an unobserved family earnings 
endowment that is common to all children in the family (f), an unob 
served child-specific endowment that distinguishes that child from the 
common family endowment (a^, and a random error term (e,) due to 
measurement error in earnings. Then for two children in a family, the 
earnings relations are:4
(1) E^bSj+f+a^e, 
and
(2) E2 = b S 2 + f + a 2 + e2
where b is the true impact of schooling. Assume further that there are 
linear schooling allocation rules that indicate how parents allocate 
schooling to two children depending on the unobserved endowments of 
each (ab a2), some common family characteristics including parental 
wealth and education and the common family endowments (X), and 
random disturbance terms (u, and u2, respectively):
(3) S! = a, a, + oc2 a2 + pX + u, 
and
(4) S2 = a, a2 + oc2 a, + PX + u2
where a, is the parental schooling allocation response to the endow 
ment of the child being invested in a2 is the parental schooling alloca 
tion response to the endowment of the other child, and p is the parental 
schooling allocation response common family characteristics. If a l is 
positive and (X2 is negative, parents reinforce endowment differentials 
by investing more in the schooling of the child with greater endow 
ments, thus increasing the inequality of the distribution of earnings. If
118 From Parent to Child
(X] is negative and a2 is positive, parents compensate for endowment 
differentials by investing more in the schooling of the child with lesser 
endowments, thus reducing inequality in the distribution of earnings.
The critical parameters in neither the earnings relations nor the 
schooling allocation relations can be estimated consistently with data 
on individuals or even on siblings. To see why, consider what happens 
if one tries to estimate the schooling effect on earnings (i.e., the param 
eter b) from relation (1) and observations on schooling and earnings 
for a number of individuals. The problem is that the schooling alloca 
tion rule in relation (3) means that schooling is correlated with family 
(f, which is in X) and individual-specific endowments (a]). Those who 
are more schooled are likely to have greater endowments, so the usual 
procedure of simply associating individual earnings with individual 
schooling does not indicate the effect of schooling alone on earnings.
Figure 4 illustrates this problem. The solid line gives the true rela 
tion between earnings and schooling, with a slope b. For individuals, 
however, data observations in general are not on this true line because 
of the random disturbance term (e,) and because of the unobserved 
endowments (f + a,). The random disturbance term takes on values that 
are independent of schooling, so it does not cause the estimated slope 
of the line to shift. However, if those with more ability tend to have 
more schooling, the unobserved endowments are likely to be larger for 
those with more schooling. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of endow 
ments that deviate positively from the average at high schooling levels 
and negatively from the average at low schooling levels (with y reflect 
ing the relation of the unobserved endowments with schooling) and 
how they twist the estimated earnings-schooling relation if they are not 
controlled in the estimation. If there is not control for such unobserved 
endowments, what is estimated by looking at the association between 
earnings and schooling is not the slope of the true relation, but the 
slope of the dashed line, which reflects in part the effects of the endow 
ments in addition to the effects of schooling. Thus, the usual procedure 
of associating schooling with earnings without control for endowments 
might overstate substantially the impact of schooling on earnings and 
other outcomes.
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Figure 4. True and Estimated Impact of Schooling on Earnings If 
Schooling Allocated in Response to Endowments
Earnings estimated 
relation
true 
relation
Schooling
How might endowments be controlled in order to obtain better esti 
mates of the impact of schooling on earnings? One possibility would 
be to follow the lead of the experimental sciences and randomly assign 
schooling rather than letting families decide on schooling. This would 
eliminate the estimation problem caused by schooling being allocated 
in response to endowments, but in most societies would be very diffi 
cult to do. A second possibility is to control for endowments using 
proxies such as IQ test scores. If endowments can be controlled com 
pletely through such observed measures, a consistent estimate of the 
true schooling effects can be obtained. But it is not clear that it is possi 
ble to measure all aspects of endowments. Moreover, some of the 
observed indicators that have been proposed to be used to control for 
endowments, such as IQ scores, may represent not only endowments 
but also dimensions of behavior including treatment at home and 
schooling.
A third possibility is to use data on identical twins to estimate the 
difference between relations (1) and (2):
(5) E, -E2 = b (S, -S2) + (f-F) + (a, -a2) + (e, -e2).
120 From Parent to Child
The effects of the family components of endowments disappear in such 
a relation. For identical twins (and only for identical twins) there are 
only common endowments (not individual-specific endowments), so 
estimation of relation (5) eliminates biases due to endowments. 5 Early 
estimates using this procedure indicate that the true impact of school 
ing on earnings is only about a third as large suggested by associations 
that do not control for endowments (Behrman and Taubman 1976; 
Behrman, Hrubec, Taubman, and Wales 1980).
But this procedure exacerbates another possible estimation problem 
noted earlier with regard to intergenerational correlations: measure 
ment error. Random measurement error in a right-side variable in a 
relation such as (1) causes the coefficient estimate of that variable to be 
biased toward zero. If the schooling measure used is noisy due to mea 
surement error, in other words, the true impact of schooling on earn 
ings is partially disguised and underestimated. Differencing between 
two schooling measures as in relation (5) if each is contaminated by 
noise exacerbates the bias towards zero due to measurement error. A 
series of recent studies has applied the twins estimator in relation (5) 
with control for measurement error (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; 
Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman 1994, 1996). These studies all 
find that control for measurement error reduces the apparent biases in 
the standard studies due to failure to control for unobserved endow 
ments. But for four of the five twins samples used, the estimates still 
indicate that there are significant upward biases in the standard esti 
mates of the impact of schooling on earnings because of the failure to 
control for endowments. For some of the U.S. samples, moreover, the 
proportion of the variance in earnings due to such endowments is con 
siderable: 27 percent of the total for men and 7 percent of the total for 
women due in individual-specific endowment variations within fami 
lies (plus another 16 percent for women due to variability in family 
endowments) in the studies in Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman 
(1994, 1996).
Most of these studies, thus, imply that intrahousehold allocations of 
schooling are in response to endowments. But estimation of relation 
(5) alone with identical twins cannot indicate whether, if endowments 
differ among children, such allocations reinforce or compensate for 
such differences. Two of these recent twins studies (Behrman, Rosenz 
weig and Taubman 1994, 1996), however, develop a procedure for esti-
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mating whether there is reinforcement or compensation in the 
schooling allocation rules by using both identical and fraternal twins 
and by estimating together with relation (5) the difference in the school 
allocations rules (obtained by subtracting relation (4) from relation (3):
(6) S, - S2 = ((*! - oc2) (a, - a2) + (u, - u2).
Intuitively, their procedure is equivalent to obtaining a consistent 
estimate of the parameter b from estimating relation (5) with identical 
twins, using this parameter to obtain an estimate of (a! - a2) by estimat 
ing relation (5) for fraternal twins, and then using this estimate of (a, - 
a2) to estimate relation (6) for fraternal twins and thus obtain an esti 
mate of ((Xj - oc2). If the estimate of (o^ - (X2) is positive, parents invest 
in schooling of their children so as to reinforce endowment differen 
tials and increase income inequalities (and vice versa if (o^ - oc2) is 
negative). The estimates indicate that there is parental reinforcement in 
that children with greater endowments have greater schooling and 
more resource-intensive (higher quality) schooling. For men, for exam 
ple, these estimates imply that positive reinforcement of endowments 
by intrahousehold allocations increases by about 80 percent absolute 
earnings differentials that emanate from preschool individual-specific 
endowment differentials.
Conclusions
Family background may play an important role in determining the 
distribution of income and who is rich and who is poor. Estimates of 
intergenerational correlations and of heritability are consistent with a 
major role of family background in determining individuals' economic 
success. With control for measurement error in earnings, the U.S. inter- 
generational experience seems characterized by many more individuals 
born into a "culture of poverty" or "with a silver spoon in their 
mouths" than by Horatio Alger "rags to riches" (or reverse Horatio 
Alger "riches to rags") stories. But it is important to remember that 
correlation or heritability descriptions of limited intergenerational 
mobility in themselves do not provide direct information about the
122 From Parent to Child
effectiveness of schooling and other means for affecting economic out 
comes. Though this point is often misunderstood, even if heritability 
estimates are high, schooling and other measures may be quite effec 
tive in altering economic outcomes.
The high association for economic outcomes across generations, 
nevertheless, suggests that what happens within households may have 
important implications for children's economic alternatives. Models 
have been developed of intrahousehold allocations of schooling and 
other human resource investments among children in the presence of 
unobserved (by social scientists but observed by the parents) heteroge- 
nous endowments of the children. The predominant model of intra 
household allocations, the wealth model, suggests that parents with 
equal concern who allocate enough resources to their children will (a) 
invest in the schooling of their children at socially efficient levels if 
there are not market imperfections, and (b) provide transfers of assets 
the income from which will offset earnings differentials among their 
children. An alternative, the Separable Earnings Transfer (SET) model, 
(a) suggests that even with no market imperfections parents will not 
necessarily invest in the schooling of their children at socially optimal 
levels, and (b) posits that the pattern of earnings among these children 
(resulting from their endowments and schooling) is not related to the 
pattern of parental resource transfers among these children.
Empirical exploration of these intrahousehold models and their 
implications is difficult because of data limitations both regarding child 
endowments and regarding the lifetime economic interactions between 
children and their parents. But progress has been made with special 
data, such as data on adult siblings including twins, their economic sta 
tus, and their economic interactions with their parents. Empirical 
explorations to date suggest some tentative conclusions. Transfers to 
children do not compensate for earnings differentials as posited in the 
wealth model with equal concern and sufficient parental resources 
devoted to children, so earnings differentials induced by intrahouse 
hold allocations among children of schooling carry over to total 
income differentials. Parental allocations of human resources among 
their children in the United States tend to reflect some concern about 
distribution among the children rather than just maximizing total 
income of the children, with some unequal concern favoring those of 
lower birth order (though not according to gender). In contrast, in the
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much poorer society of rural India, there is much less concern about 
distribution and there is unequal concern favoring sons when resources 
are tightest (as well as unequal concern favoring low birth order chil 
dren). But still, in the United States, parents on net reinforce endow 
ment differentials by investing more in the schooling of better- 
endowed children in a manner that almost doubles the impact of 
within-family endowment differentials on earnings. Thus, endowment 
differentials among children in the same families and intrahousehold 
allocations in response to such endowments play an important role in 
increasing earnings and income inequalities in the United States; the 
within-family endowment differentials alone account for a quarter of 
the variation of In earnings for males, which is reinforced by schooling 
allocations to account for over two-fifths of the total variation in earn 
ings. The importance of unobserved endowments in intrahousehold 
allocations, finally, reinforces the importance of considering what 
determines schooling in attempts to evaluate the impact of schooling 
on economic and other outcomes in order to attain estimates of the 
effects of schooling per se that are not contaminated by effects of 
unobserved abilities, motivations, and family connections.
NOTES
The author has benefited in preparing this paper from collaborative work with a number of 
individuals through the years, but particularly from work with Robert A Pollak, Mark R. Rosenz- 
weig, and Paul Taubman The author also thanks Jon R. Neill and two reviewers from the Upjohn 
Institute for editonal suggestions that have improved the presentation
1 It can be shown that hentabihty as defined above is equal to twice the difference in the cor 
relation for identical versus fraternal twins
2 In these two models, parents make the active decision and the children are passive In other 
models, the children may attempt to actively manipulate the outcomes to their advantage (e g , 
Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 1985, Pollak 1988) Parents also may have unified objectives or 
may bargain over various allocations (see survey in Behrman 1995) For simplicity, I limit my 
attention here to models with passive children and with parents who have unified objectives
3 Some might question whether families with twins are so different from other families that 
one cannot learn much of general value from studying families with twins. But the procedures that 
are used to study within-family allocations to twins effectively control for the family effects (f and 
X below) that might reflect differences in families that have twins from other families
4. I limit this presentation to the two-child family for simplicity, but the basic points hold if 
there are more children in the family
5. For any siblings, not just identical twins, the common family component is controlled with 
such estimates It might appear that it is better to control for that common component with sibling 
data than to use individual data But that is not necessarily true The bias may be greater with sib 
ling estimates due to the difference in individual-specific endowments than in individual estimates 
(Gnhches 1979)
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The Reality of Redistribution
Gordon Tullock 
University of Arizona
This discussion is rather unusual in that I cannot remember the 
rather simple point made in it ever having appeared in the literature. 
This may indicate that I have been careless in my reading, so I hope 
that any of you who have seen it before will let me know.
That there is a tradeoff between redistribution of income and the 
total production of society and its rate of growth is believed by every 
one, although there is little empirical evidence. Okun actually wrote a 
full book on this subject, coining the phrase: "the leaky bucket." One 
aspect of the tradeoff, however, seems to have been ignored. I shall 
begin my discussion of this point with a little example using numbers 
that I have simply drawn out of the air.
The reader will quickly realize that the importance of the phenome 
non depends very heavily on these numbers. Thus, this example is 
intended as illustrative only. After I have presented the example, we 
will turn to discussing what effect different numbers would have, con 
sider social mobility, and deal with risk aversion. This part of the chap 
ter is, at least subjectively, original. In order to deal with some likely 
objections, at the end I will repeat some arguments I have used before 
on relative deprivation and international transfers, and then turn to a 
few remarks on charitable motivation.
Redistribution and Growth
Let us assume, then, that the United States government takes mea 
sures to supplement the income of the bottom 20 percent by an average 
of 50 percent, funding the transfer by an income tax on the upper 80 
percent. Let us assume it does this in some reasonably efficient way 
without going into details. This should slow down the rate of growth at
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least somewhat, and for purposes of this example I will assume the rate 
of growth falls from 5 percent a year to 3 percent.
As a result of this, the local GNP 15 years in the future will be 
enough smaller than it would have been had we not retarded growth by 
this scheme that the people in the bottom one-fifth of the population 
will receive lower incomes than they would have received had the 
transfer not been made. 1 Further, they will continue to receive lower 
incomes throughout all eternity with the differences steadily getting 
greater. The upper 80 percent were worse off from the word go unless 
they received enough satisfaction from helping the poor to compensate. 
In any event, they will be worse off even with the strong charitable 
motives after 15 years.
Figure 1 shows that situation. The line UU and the line LL are the 
income of the upper 80 percent, and the lower 20 percent without 
transfers. The line UP and the line LP are the post-transfer lines. The 
lines cross at 15 years for the poor, and UP is everywhere below UU 
for the well-off. The reality illustrated in this figure raises at least three 
questions, two regarding the purpose of the transfer scheme, the third a 
deep ethical question that economists tend to ignore.
The first question that we need to ask is whether this transfer has 
benefited the poor. Certainly this would depend upon a number of 
things, but most important the age of the poor person, his or her dis 
count rate, and the effect of the transfer on the growth rate of his or her 
income. Ceteris paribus, young people would tend to regard the 
tradeoff as decidedly negative while poor people who happen to be the 
same age as the current ruler of China, Deng Hsiao-Ping, would think 
it a bargain. If poverty is primarily an affliction of the young and old, 
we have the house that redistribution is intended to benefit much 
divided. The public choice implications of this situation should be 
obvious.
The second question that comes to my mind relates to the intergen- 
erational transfer resulting from any policy that reduces the growth 
rate. To look at it from the standpoint of all poor people (or the charita 
ble well-off), the scheme would mean that in the future all poor people 
are poorer than they otherwise would be. On the other hand, with the 
economy growing anyway, people who are made poorer, i.e., the poor 
in the future, would nevertheless be better off than the people who are 
poor right now. Thus, it could be regarded as a transfer from the future
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population—rich, poor, and middle-class—to the bottom 20 percent
now/
Figure 1. Income through Time
Log income
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It is not obvious that this is undesirable. It is similar to the situation 
in which we deliberately retard investment now in order to raise cur 
rent consumption with the full knowledge that the consumption in the 
future will be lowered, but will still be higher than it is now. However, 
this thinking seems only to be pertinent to affluent societies, since it is 
the reverse of the position taken by most development economists. 
What we frequently find in this literature is the recommendation that 
people should be compelled to increase their savings because the 
reduction in present consumption would be more than paid for by the 
increase in future consumption. 3
This effect can be shown on the same diagram as we have given 
above. All that is necessary is to assume that the UP and the LP lines 
are the status quo with which we start before the transfer. The govern 
ment then takes money from the poor and gives it to the well-off, thus
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generating PP and the UU lines. This would effectively involve a tax 
on the poor. 4 Of course, the development economists never actually 
proposed this kind of thing. They were simply going to put a general 
tax on the present generation and use it to subsidize capital accumula 
tion, including human capital accumulation. Their idea was to cause 
higher growth. They normally talked about helping the poor, but as a 
matter of fact, most of the taxes were drawn from the poorest of the 
poor, the farmers, and the principal beneficiaries were civil servants 
and other government associates who are far from poor.
In any event, these programs have not worked but the basic reason is 
not that there was anything wrong with the theory. It was that actual 
implementation was very badly done. The famous bridge over the 
lower Congo connecting one dirt track with another dirt track is only 
one of many examples. 5
Most economists would agree that this program of taking funds 
from the poor and giving them to the well-off would accelerate growth, 
and you will note that all of the arguments we have made before are 
reversed here. After a short period of time the poor would be better off. 
In this case, since the poor are better off in the future rather than now, 
transferring money from the present day poor who are very poor to the 
future poor who, although poor by the standards of the future, are bet 
ter off, enhances the regressive-nature of the income transfer.
Some Ethical Questions
Redistributionists seem to think that they occupy the moral high 
ground. As I have said on other occasions, I am puzzled by the habit of 
discussing redistribution within a narrow geographical context. In most 
discussions of income redistribution, the really poor people in the 
world—people who live in places like Africa, India, and China—are 
left out. The homeless in Tucson are bad-off by American standards, but 
by the standards of India, they are rather well-off. They are certainly 
vastly better-off than the street people of Calcutta or the street children 
of Columbia. They are also in many dimensions better-off than their 
own ancestors were a few generations back. Their medical attention in 
particular is better than anything available until very recently.
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In any event, the decision to lower the rate of growth in the United 
States by making income transfers will reduce the rate of growth in 
other countries. We are connected to them by international trade and, 
perhaps more important, by the trade in ideas, particularly the ideas for 
new or improved devices. When the production of these falls off, living 
standards will fall or perhaps simply not grow as rapidly in the rest of 
the world. This nexus can only make the Tightness of redistribution 
more ambiguous.
The tendency of redistributionists to be much more concerned for 
the people of their own nation is an interesting phenomenon. Tucson is 
only 100 miles from the Mexican border, and a great deal of money is 
spent by the federal, state, and local governments in helping the poor in 
Tucson, most of whom even without that help would be better off than 
the average Mexican. All of them would be better off than the most 
impoverished Mexicans. To repeat, I find this curious, but most people 
I talk to find it quite natural. Presumably redistributionists have a will 
ingness to trade off their personal welfare for that of others, and like all 
rational agents, are less interested in this tradeoff as its cost rises. That 
this preference should be given moral connotation is interesting, partic 
ularly if these preferences are dependent on the ethnic identity of the 
parties.
In any case, there are other ethical questions that redistribution 
raises. Let us return to our basic discussion of the transfer of funds 
from upper income to the lower. I do not think that in the real world a 
formal program with the announced objective of taking money from 
the poor to benefit the upper income as a way of getting faster growth 
will ever be adopted.
Turning to my example, it is not clear that the transfer is to the ben 
efit of the people at the bottom. But, as the reader will no doubt have 
already noticed, it depends to a considerable extent on the exact num 
bers that I have chosen. Suppose that the effect on growth were less. As 
far as I know we have no clear-cut measures of the degree to which 
transfers reduce growth. Suppose for example, it would be not 15 but 
150 years before the incomes of the bottom 20 percent would be as low 
or lower than they would be without the transfer.
The first thing to be said about this is that the out-of-pocket costs to 
the upper 80 percent would be exactly the same in the two different
132 The Reality of Redistribution
examples, and transfers of this sort are normally urged in terms of the 
desirability of the upper class sacrificing for the lower.
Members of the lower class could all assume that they would be 
dead by the time the change occurred, and so they and other poor peo 
ple would remain better off, indeed the children of the poor people, if 
they remained in the poorer class, would be better off. It would be the 
grandchildren and great grandchildren that would begin to suffer if 
families remained firmly fixed in poverty.
If we follow Barro and assume that people regarded their descen 
dants as important as themselves, then the period of crossover would 
be irrelevant. The poor person would worry about his or her descen 
dants in the year 3000 and would be opposed to the transfer. As far as I 
know no one except Barro actually believes that people behave that 
way. But if people do not, then on what moral authority do we transfer 
income from these future generations? Unlike the present generation of 
the wealthy, they have no democratic voice. They are entirely without 
representation, even though the burden of redistribution falls on them 
as surely as it falls on the present generation of wealthy citizens.
There are various numbers that would lead to the crossover point 
being somewhere between 15 and 150 and would lead to different atti 
tudes on the part of the present poor. With present data we cannot say 
exactly how long the period would be. It seems to me that this provides 
an incentive for getting better numbers.
Social Mobility, Relative Deprivation, and Other Conundra
We now turn to social mobility and subsequently to aversion. I have 
implicitly assumed that people who are at the bottom 20 percent or in 
the top 80 percent will stay there, and that they expect their children to 
do likewise. 6 This is not true in most societies, and certainly not in 
ours. The poor, in particular, tend to think that their children will do 
better in life than they themselves have done.
Circulation is to be expected, and we have an interesting asymmetry 
in the effects of this scheme. For the sake of illustration, assume that 
the average person in the bottom 20 percent believes that he will get 
out of it into the top 80 percent in 10 years. He will receive transfers
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only for the first 10 years of the program. However, if the bottom 20 
percent moves up, one quarter of the top 80 percent must move down.
For people presently in the bottom 20 percent, the expected benefit 
from the transfer is therefore reduced. On the other hand, the possibil 
ity of falling into the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution less 
ens the injury that the transfer inflicts on upper income people. 
Whether or not social mobility makes transfers more likely from a pub 
lic choice perspective would depend on many factors.
Of course, the assumption of the change occurring at the end of 10 
years is arbitrary, and also the assumption that the entire bottom group 
goes up. If we wanted to make a more precise argument here we would 
need a little algebra, but in the absence of any numbers to put in equa 
tions it doesn't seem worthwhile elaborating it. The general principles 
for these simple numerical examples would continue to apply.
This brings us to the topic of risk aversion. The reader, we hope, will 
remember that risk aversion, and the justification for income redistribu 
tion from upper income people to lower based on it was the major 
theme of chapter 13 in The Calculus of Consent. 1 Since most people 
buy insurance at actuarially unfair prices, there is good reason to 
believe that most people are risk averse. Therefore, some kind of 
income insurance would be attractive to most people.
With risk aversion, even if everything we have said so far were true, 
we might get unanimous consent for an income redistribution scheme. 
It presumably would not be the kind of income redistribution we see in 
the United States, and other advanced countries in which you don't get 
help just because you are poor, but only if you are in certain appropri 
ate categories. The bureaucratic difficulties, which mean you fre 
quently don't get help at all until sometime after its need has become 
acute, would also be removed.
The first question is how much people are willing to pay for such 
insurance. The retarding of the growth rate of the income of the poor 
obviously makes it more expensive than in most traditional discus 
sions. However, a lot of this would depend on where you made your 
decision. You might make decisions today in favor of redistributing to 
the poor which 200 years from now your descendants will bitterly 
regret. It would be true even of poor descendants.
There is a metaphysical problem. Since risk is something that most 
people avoid, reducing the risk is a positive service for society. Unfor-
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tunately, it is not included in GNP, but for calculations such as we are 
making here we should at least mention the fact. It might be that the 
reduced growth rate shown in the figure is actually the growth with the 
service of risk reduction left out. It is not impossible, although I think it 
is unlikely, that the service of risk reduction, if included, could more 
than compensate for all the problems we have raised so far.
So far, I have merely discussed in a very vague way this particular 
problem. I think it would be thought of more, but it may be that it 
already has been thought of and carefully discussed in literature that I 
have not seen. To repeat, I hope any reader who knows of such litera 
ture will let me know. We will now turn to material that I know has 
been published before but that is needed to make this chapter even rea 
sonably complete.
Let us turn now to relative deprivation, and here I will be repeating 
arguments I have made before. 8 It is sometimes said that people are not 
interested particularly in their actual income but in their comparative 
income. An American living in Harlem is bothered more by the 
absence of a colored television which all the neighbors have than is a 
mother living in the Sahel when her child dies in a famine that takes the 
lives of many other children in her village.
You can see from my example that I regard it as basically an absurd 
proposition. I do not deny that to some extent it is true I can be jealous 
of people who are better off than I am, Harvard professors in particular. 
Indeed, I would think the fact that all the villagers are in danger of 
dying this way as a reason for increasing our worry about the matter 
rather than assuming that the parents don't mind.
To continue with my attack on the relative deprivation hypothesis, I 
usually refer to it as belief that if everybody has a toothache it doesn't 
really hurt. I should say that in my opinion this kind of feeling is pre 
dominantly an upper class one. We don't worry about starving, but we 
want to be respected by our acquaintances. This requires that our con 
sumption be at least up to community standards. If we were really 
poor, such matters would be less important. Even if it becomes psycho 
logically more important as we become wealthier, and the poor 
become better off, it is still a secondary effect. The people classified as 
poor in the United States have many privileges that Louis XIV would 
have liked.
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Let us ignore the lesser cases, and invent a very extreme example. 
Consider Mr. Jones. He lives in Newport, Rhode Island in the 1890s, 
and his private yacht is only 100 feet long. None of the people he asso 
ciates with have private yachts less than 200 feet long. The city fathers 
feel that this situation of relative deprivation cannot be tolerated. They 
put a tax on the wealthier people like J. Pierpont Morgan in order to 
supplement Mr. Jones' income so that he can have a yacht that is 150 
feet long. The result of this is greater equality among the yachtsmen of 
Newport, but the rest of the world as a whole is somewhat worse off if 
these very highly paid and presumably productive people work less 
hard in reaction to the tax. 9
It is hard to argue that this particular equalization of income is a 
good idea. I should say, however, that I have made this point in a num 
ber of lectures. Academia audiences normally showed signs of being 
unhappy, but did not otherwise respond. On one occasion, however, a 
professor did point out that in spite of the fact that poor people in the 
United States and the world were made worse off by this transfer of 
funds to Mr. Jones for a larger yacht, it might well have been true that 
the measured inequality of society would decline. This is true, but I 
have great difficulty believing anyone would support the policy for that 
reason.
There are, of course, reasons for the sort of behavior that I have been 
focusing on. Namely, a person may feel more strongly about the pov 
erty of people who live nearby than about the poverty of those living 
far away. Tucsonites would therefore be more concerned about the 
poor of Tucson than the poor of Mexico, and no one would be for 
equalizing American and African incomes. Interestingly, this particular 
hypothesis would seem to imply that most poverty relief should be ini 
tiated at a local level. For instance, the City of Tucson should take care 
of its poor, with possibly the State of Arizona providing some assis 
tance. But the federal government would be uninvolved in these pro 
grams.
It should be said that before the 1930s, aid to the poor was in fact 
administered locally. Liebergott's studies show that the poor did about 
as well relatively then as they do now. If people felt more strongly 
about the poor who are close, they would have done better. So to me, 
the situation remains a mystery.
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A student of mine, studying income tax returns, came to the conclu 
sion that the average American is willing to give about 5 percent of his 
income to the people who are worse off than he is. This is a rough fig 
ure and is only an average. Mother Cabrina gives more than 5 percent, 
and I am sure there are many people who give less. If you take the 
amount of money paid out by welfare states to the actual poor, let us 
define them as the bottom 10 percent, it usually turns out to be about 5 
percent of GNP. This is not surprising as, after all, the people who 
make the private charitable gifts are actually the people who vote for 
government charitable gifts. So, we get the same outcome in both 
areas.
These data have led me to a rule of thumb, which is simply that peo 
ple are willing to give away approximately 5 percent of their incomes 
for the aid of the poor and downtrodden. The whole thing is rather like 
dropping a stone into a bottomless pit. No one has ever complained 
about it. There are people who claim they give much more than 5 per 
cent, but I am a little skeptical in most cases. Yet the fact that some 
people give more than 5 percent is not surprising. There are also people 
who seem to think that any government transfer even if it goes to mil 
lionaire farmers is somehow a charitable gift. Although no one ever 
objects to my generalization, I am impressed by the fact that it is rare 
anyone even comments on it. Further, with one exception, no one ever 
cites this particular point of view. 10 Note, I am not saying that people 
refuse to believe. They never object to it. It is just something that is 
dropped into the memory hole.
If we move from the amount of money that people actually give 
away to what people say, they would appear to be much more charita 
ble than they actually are. Thus, the American government is accused 
of being heartless because it doesn't give even more money to the poor. 
Frequently moralists accuse the whole society of being unduly selfish. 
It is noteworthy then that in the 1980s—supposedly the decade of 
indulgence, selfishness, and greed—private contributions to charity 
rose more rapidly than in any other recent decade. The people who 
decry the Zeitgeist of selfishness never mention this.
I take a radically different attitude from most people. I observe peo 
ple saying that they are more charitable than they actually are, and crit 
icizing other people for not being more charitable than they actually 
are. The normal reaction is that we should all be nicer. My reaction is
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different. I think we should simply admit that we are all charitable, but 
not very much so. Since we don't seem to be able to get these charita 
ble contributions up above 5 percent, I would suggest that we simply 
admit this fact, and change what we say rather than what we do.
Economists normally think that what people do is a better measure 
of their preferences than what they say. Democratic governments are 
designed to give people what they want. By this is meant what they 
actually want, not what people say they want. I can think of all sorts of 
changes in the behavior of most groups which I think would be a good 
idea. We live in a democracy and democracies do what most people 
want, not what I want. I can vote like anyone else if I want to use it. 
Engaging in moral lectures on what people should want is a harmless 
activity, but it is also an unproductive one. Everyone is in favor of help 
ing the poor, at least a little bit. However, there is little discussion of 
the theoretical problems surrounding income transfers. I hope that 
these realities regarding the motivation for and effect of redistribution 
would be carefully considered before any drastic antipoverty measures 
are taken.
NOTES
1.1 am ignoring the point that was made by Browning and reinforced by other people that the 
transfer actually costs much more than the benefit. The reason is that it changes the behavior of 
both the victims and the people to whom it would be transferred It is not that I regard this as 
wrong or unimportant, but it is not necessary for this discussion.
2. Plus the top 80 percent.
3. Probably the best presentation of this point of view was by Stephen Marglin, "The Social 
Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, Febru 
ary 1963, pp 95-111 This argument was replied to by me in "The Social Rate of Discount and the 
Optimal Rate of Investment. Comment" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1968, 58 (4), pp. 
788-802 Marglin was also attacked by three other economists In fact, I think you can say that 
intellectually it is perhaps the most thoroughly demolished idea in the literature Nevertheless, the 
development economists held fast, and Marglin never formally changed position.
4. I trust the reader does not take this suggestion seriously enough so that I will be asked to 
explain what you do with those poor who literally die of starvation if they have to pay a tax. As a 
matter of fact, one could designate this a true negative income tax, not the fake negative income 
tax of the University of Chicago In this case the tax you paid would be under a certain income 
proportional to the degree you fell short of that income, and if you are above that certain income 
you would receive a supplement proportional to the degree you are above. It must be admitted that 
this scheme deserves the title "Negative Income Tax" better than the more traditional usage.
5 This is famous because of the expense of the bndge It should be said that like most World 
Bank projects it was well engineered You can feel confident that the bridge will not fall down, 
which is not necessarily true of the work of many of the other aid agencies.
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6.1 follow the normal nationalistic assumptions and consider only Americans Most people in 
the top 80 percent of most countries would be in the bottom 20 percent of ours
7. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1962, pp 189-201
8 The Economics of Income Redistribution, Dordrecht Kluwer, 1983.
9. Few of the wealthy people at that time inherited their money.
10 Martin Paldam is that exception
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